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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, 
V. 
DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 20160485-SC 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is before this Court on a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal under Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND 
GROUNDS FOR APPEAL 
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted by Order of this Court on 
September 12, 2016 as to the following issues: 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a witness whose 
preliminary hearing testimony was admitted at trial was unavailable and 
that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses against him was violated by the presentation of the 
preliminary hearing1estimony at his trial. 
2. Whether the ·Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioners petition for 
rehearing raising new arguments that trial and appellate counsel provided 
ineffective assistance. 
I 
A copy of the court of appeals decision in State v. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, 
is included in Addendum A. Appellant addresses the issues as follows: 
I. Right of Confrontation Violation. 
A. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's 
ruling admitting preliminary hearing testimony of a victim/witness. ~ 
B. Standard of Review: On certiorari this Court reviews a decision of the 
Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court, for correctness, turning in part on 
whether the Court of Appeals accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ,I 15, 144 P.3d 1096, 1101 
(Sup.Ct.). "When reviewing rulings on hearsay, we review '[l]egal questions regarding @ 
admissibility ... for correctness, ... questions of fact ... for clear error,' and the final 
'ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion."' State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ,I 
10, 314 P.3d 1014 quoting State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, ,I 9, 243 P.3d 902. 
Interpretations of federal and state constitutions are questions of law. State v. 
Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ,I 7, 218 P.3d 590, 593 (Sup.Ct.). Where it is not contended 
that the analysis under the Utah Constitution is any different from the analysis under the 
federal constitution, a defendant's contentions are reviewed under the federal 
constitution. State v. Drawn, 791 P .2d 890, 893 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Specific 
analysis must be provided for this Court to engage in state constitutional analysis. State 
v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) A trial court's admission of testimonial 
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id., 791 P.2d at 894. To hold a ® 
2 
constitutional error harmless, it must be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
@ State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327,359 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1993) 
C. Grounds for Review: The day before trial, defense counsel objected to the 
admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of an absent witness, who had not been 
subpoenaed, as purportedly "unavailable" pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 804. R.166:6-7. The 
trial court overruled the objection. R.166 at 12-13, 34. The next day, at trial, defense 
counsel renewed the objection to admission of the preliminary hearing testimony, 
arguing, inter alia, that the State's efforts were insufficient and that further attempts to 
locate the witness should have been made. R.167 :2-17. The district court again overruled 
~ the objection, and the witness' testimony was played for the jury. R.167:149. 
II. The Court of Appeals Denial Or Refusal To Rule On Goins' Petition For 
Rehearing Regarding Erroneous Self-Defense Jury Instruction. 
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in denying or refusing to decide the 
issue regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise the issue of 
trial counsel's ineffective assistance in submitting an erroneous self-defense jury 
instruction which previous appellate counsel had failed to bring to the court's attention? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari this Court reviews a decision of the 
Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court, for correctness, which turns, in part, 
on whether it accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard 
of review. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ,r 15, 144 P.3d 1096, 1101 (Sup.Ct.). Where 
defense counsel affirmatively approved the jury instruction at trial, it is reviewed under 
3 
the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ,r 7, 
132 P.3d 703, 707. Ineffective assistance of counsel questions require a showing that Ci 
counsel's performance was deficient, "that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness" and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). 
Grounds for Review: The Court of Appeals issued its decision, State v. Goins, 
2016 UT App 57 on March 24, 2016. Newly appointed undersigned counsel petitioned 
the Court of Appeals for a rehearing on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
appeal, on April 19, 2016. On April 25, 2016 the Utah Court of Appeals requested 
further briefing on the issue of whether ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal could 
be raised in a petition for rehearing. On May 4, 2016, Petitioner submitted further 
briefing on that issue. On May 17, 2016, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its Order 
denying the petition for rehearing without comment. 
During discussion of proposed jury instructions, the subject arose of Defendant's 
requested instruction discussing the burden and weight, inter alia, relative to self-defense. 
R.60. The trial court gave the instruction as written, "over the State's objection." R.167: 
229-231. Respecting the underlying issue of the faulty jury instruction, unpreserved 
claims before the trial court are reviewed for plain error and/ or ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ,r 28,276 P.3d 1207, 1218. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The statutes and rules relevant to the issues are included in Addendum C. 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
Desean Michael Goins was convicted of Aggravated Assault, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2006), and Threatening with or Using 
a Dangerous Weapon in Fight or Quarrel, a Class A Misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Ann.§ 76-10-506 (2010). R.75-76;R.168:51-52. The Defendant was acquitted of 
® one charge of Mayhem, a second degree felony under Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-105. Id. 
For the offense of Aggravated Assault, Mr. Goins was sentenced to a suspended 
prison term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison; for the offense of Threatening 
with or Using Dangerous Weapon in Fight or Quarrel, Mr. Goins was sentenced to 180 
days in the Salt Lake County jail, with credit for 158 days served, and was placed on 
probation for 36 months with AP&P. R.139-141. Judgement, Sentence and 
Commitment, Addendum D. An Order to Show Cause and Warrant of Arrest, R.161-
164, were issued based upon affidavits of Mr. Goins' probation officer, R.159-160, 194-
(i) 196. The record on appeal does not reflect the disposition, however, the trial court 
revoked his probation and he is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. 
Amended Minute Entry, Order to Show Cause, July 14, 2014, Addendum E. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The three counts of the Amended Information involved two victims: Counts I and 
5 
II, Jacob Omar, and Count III, Gabriel Estrada. R.16-18 (See Amended Information, 
Addendum B, probable cause statement); R.166:2. 
The preliminary hearing testimony of Gabriel Estrada. R.202:2-13, which was 
played for the jury at trial, R.167:149, reflects the following. On July 5, 2013, Desean 
Goins and his girlfriend, Star, went to Pioneer Park in Salt Lake City in an effort to locate 
an individual named Gabriel Estrada; Desean believed Gabriel Estrada had stolen his cell 
phone the night before. R.202 :5. Goins confronted Estrada outside of the homeless 
shelter near Pioneer Park about the missing cell phone, pulled out a knife, and waived it 
in front of Estrada, threatening him if he didn't return his phone. R.202:4-7. Estrada 
denied stealing Goins' cell phone, indicating to Goins that his friend had awakened @ 
before Estrada had and left (inferentially with Goins' cell phone). R. 202:7. Estrada then 
indicated he had nothing to do with it and walked away. Id. 
Desean Goins and Star then approached Jacob Omar, who was asleep on a blanket 
in the park. R. 167 at 123-124. According to the testimony of Omar, Goins and Star 
accused his "street son," Gabriel Estrada, of stealing Desean's cell phone. R.167-124-
125. During the State's direct examination, the testimony Jacob Omar first brought forth 
the issue of Mr. Goins acting in self-defense. Mr. Omar indicated on direct examination 
by the prosecution that he was being questioned by Mr. Goins and his friend, Star, and 
that Mr. Omar was the initial aggressor: 
Next thing I knew just because being waken up in the middle of the 
afternoon to this nonsense, I see Desean stepping onto my blanket. I don't 




R.167:124-125. The Defendant was then placed in a defensive position and 
reacted accordingly. R.167: 125-6. A physical altercation ensued, and when Jacob Omar 
was on top of Mr. Goins during the fight and holding him down on the ground, Omar 
claimed that Goins took a bite of Jacob's earlobe. R.167 at 127. The fight continued, and 
Omar testified that Goins had bitten off his earlobe and stabbed him under his left arm. 
R.167 at 128-131. Police responding to the scene apprehended and arrested Desean 
Goins. 
The State charged Desean Goins by Amended Information with one count of 
(ii) Mayhem, a second degree felony, and two counts of Aggravated Assault, third degree 
felonies, and a jury trial was scheduled for October 23-24, 2013. R. 16-18. 
During discussion of proposed jury instructions, the subject arose of defendant's 
requested instruction discussing the burden and weight, inter alia, relative to self-defense. 
R.60. The trial court gave the instruction as written, "over the State's objection." R.167: 
229-231. See instruction, No. 24. 
Following the completion of the trial, the jury acquitted the Defendant of the 
charge of Mayhem, but returned a guilty verdict for one count of Aggravated Assault for 
the stabbing of Jacob Omar, and for a lesser included a charge of Threatening with or 
Using Dangerous Weapon in Fight or Quarrel, a Class A misdemeanor, for the encounter 
with Gabriel Estrada. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The State failed to carry its heightened burden under the Confrontation Clause of 
establishing that Gabriel Estrada was an "unavailable" witness, which would allow the 
State to utilize his preliminary hearing testimony at trial. The trial court's ruling that the 
witness was unavailable was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the witness 
was a victim and the only percipient witness to the event about which he testified. Even 
if the witness was technically unavailable, his testimony from preliminary hearing should 
not have been allowed at trial as counsel did not have the opportunity to conduct full and 
fair cross-examination at trial, for several reasons, one of which is that only plausibility 
and not credibility are in issue at preliminary hearing, the sole purpose of a preliminary 
hearing being for the establishment of probable cause pursuant to Utah State 
Constitution, Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. 
2. Undersigned counsel was appointed after the decision in State v. Goins was issued. It 
was apparent that prior appointed counsel had failed to raise an important issue. 
Undersigned counsel petitioned the Court of Appeals for a rehearing on the basis that 
prior counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of the ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel in submitting an erroneous self-defense instruction which the trial court used 
to instruct the jury. The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing without 
comment. The Court of Appeals should have decided the merits of Mr. Goins' Petition 
for Rehearing on the basis of the ineffective assistance of prior counsel on appeal. This 
Court should reverse and remand on the basis of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
8 
@ 
and the prejudice effected by the erroneous jury instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING AN UNSUBPOENAED 
WITNESS UNAVAILABLE UNDER RULE 804 AND ADMITTING HIS 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT. 
A. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES. 
On October 23, 2013, the district court informed the parties that a jury panel had 
not been called for the first day of trial in this case, and therefore the trial was postponed 
until the following day. R.166:2-3. Gabriel Estrada did not appear for trial that morning 
and the State made an offer of proof as to his unavailability under Utah R. Evid., Rule 
804, and request to use his testimony from preliminary hearing at trial, to which Mr. 
Goins objected. R.166:3-12. A copy of this portion of the trial transcript is included in 
Addendum F. The State proffered that a subpoena was emailed to Gabriel Estrada's 
pastor, Russ, who purportedly gave Mr. Estrada notice of the court date. R.166:4-5. 
Defense counsel accepted the proffer, R.166: 12, but objected, arguing, inter alia, that Mr. 
Estrada was not shown to be "unavailable" pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 804, that 
his testimony was inadmissible under the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation, and that the preliminary hearing testimony should not be admissible at 
trial. R.166:6-7,9-11. 
The trial court overruled the objection, finding that Gabriel Estrada was 
9 
unavailable under Rule 804 and allowed his preliminary hearing testimony to be 
admissible at trial the following day. R.166:12-13, 34. 
On October 24, 2013, day two of the trial, still not disputing the State's proffer, 
R.167:14, defense counsel renewed the objection to the admission of Gabriel Estrada's 
preliminary hearing testimony, arguing, inter alia, that the State's efforts to locate Mr. 
Estrada were insufficient and that further attempts to locate him should have been made 
in the light of the fact that the trial was postponed. R.167 :2-19. A copy of this portion of 
the transcript is contained in Addendum G. The defense further argued that the defense 
had a different motive in cross-examining Estrada at trial and that certain matters 
contained in the preliminary hearing transcript should not be allowed in evidence, e.g., @ 
Estrada's statement that he moved out from living with Mr. Goins when his "bike ended 
up missing," R.202:16, inferring that Mr. Goins had stolen it. Id. The trial court again 
overruled the objection, and Gabriel Estrada's testimony was played for the jury during 
trial. R.167:16-19,149. A copy of Mr. Estrada's testimony is contained in Addendum H. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE @ 
STATE MADE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO PROCURE THE 
ATTENDANCE OF THE WITNESS. THE WITNESS WAS NOT 
SHOWN TO BE "UNAVAILABLE." 
The Court of Appeals determined the State had made a sufficient effort to produce @ 
the victim/witness, Gabriel Estrada, by keeping in touch with people believed to know 
him. Goins at ,r,r 4 - 5. At no time does the record indicate that, during the time period 
in which this person could have been subpoenaed, that the State sought by conventional @ 
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means to actually serve a subpoena upon him. Nevertheless, the trial court allowed the 
@ testimony from preliminary hearing to be read to the jury over Mr. Goins' objection. 
Goins at 16. 
The Court of Appeals agreed that the statement was hearsay under Utah R. Evid., 
Rule 801, subject to an exception, i.e, "the admission of prior testimony by an 
unavailable potential witness." Goins at 1 8. The Court of Appeals agreed that a good 
faith effort must be made to produce the witness before a finding of unavailability can be 
made. Id. at 1 9. "A party can only introduce a witness' testimonial statements into 
evidence if the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the opposing party had a prior 
(i) opportunity to cross-ex~mine." State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, 19, 218 P.3d 590. The 
Court of Appeals cited authority, however, to the effect that Rule 804(a)(5) does not 
require a patently futile attempt to serve a subpoena on a potential witness . . . whose 
physical location and address are completely unknown. Goins at 1 10. It cited State v. 
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), in support of its position that the prosecution 
had made every reasonable effort to procure the attendance of the witness. 
One major distinction, however, between the circumstances in Drawn and the 
instant case, is that, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, in Drawn, the pro~ecution 
actually subpoenaed the witness three times. Goins at 1 11. In the instant case, while 
some effort was made to keep in touch with Pastor Russ, who was familiar with the 
witness, by e-mailing him a copy of the subpoena, R.166:4, there is no indication in the 
@ record that any effort was made to actually serve a subpoena upon Mr. Estrada, in 
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accordance with the requirements of the law, at any time. If the pastor was able to locate 
Mr. Estrada and inform him of the trial date, surely the State could have subpoenaed him @ 
properly and directly. The State proffered that it maintained contact with Russ and, when 
he left for another job, with his replacement, Jacob. Upon hearing from Jacob that Mr. 
Estrada, "in the last few weeks," had gotten into trouble and was in jail, R.166:4-5, it 
would have been a perfect opportunity for the State to properly effect service of the 
subpoena on Estrada, but the State did not do that, nor did it even check the jail roster 
until the week and the day before trial, whereupon it found Estrada to have been released. 
R.166:5. The subpoena was merely e-mailed and presumably passed along, although we 
don't have a concrete record that Estrada received trial notice. 
The State was able to produce Mr. Estrada at the preliminary hearing to testify. 
According to the record, the State sent a subpoena for Mr. Estrada for the trial, to Pastor 
Russ via email and asked him to give it Mr. Estrada. R.166:3-5. The State relied solely 
upon that method. R.166:2-6. That constitutes a feeble effort by any standard. 
The State apparently was no longer in touch with Pastor Russ at the time of trial. 
R.166:4. No testimony from him was presented at time of trial. The Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure has specific requirements in the service of subpoenas upon witnesses. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 14. Proper service of a subpoena can be effected as follows: "(3) A @ 
subpoena may be served by any person over the age of 18 years who is not a party. 
Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the witness or interpreter 
personally and notifying the witness or interpreter of the contents. A peace officer shall @ 
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serve any subpoena delivered for service in the peace officer's county." Id. It is a matter 
~ of conjecture whether the subpoena was actually served, let alone whether it was served 
in accordance with Rule 14. 
One of the safeguards of having a responsible person, such as a constable or 
sheriff, serve a subpoena, is that a proper return gives opposing counsel reasonable notice 
of the actual service. It is not for nothing that the Rule requires that, "( 4) Written return 
of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to the court and to the person requesting 
that the subpoena be served, stating the time and place of service and by whom service 
was made." Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 14. That did not occur in this case. This failure 
severely undermines the question of the witness' unavailability. 
Federal courts give certain deference to State court proceedings. The United 
States Supreme Court noted that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254, imposes a highly deferential standard in evaluating 
state-court rulings, demanding that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 
doubt." Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 66, 132 S. Ct. 490, 491 (2011). For State court 
purposes, the United States Supreme Court applied the standard that, "a witness is not 
'unavailable' for purposes of the ... confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial 
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial." Id., 565 U.S. at 
69 quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 724-725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 
(1968). "The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness ... is a 
(§) question of reasonableness." Hardy, 565 U.S. at 70 quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
13 
56, 74, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (1980) [reversed on other grounds, Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004)]. The Tenth Circuit @ 
recognizes that "( d)espite the loss of . . . important aspects of confrontation, where the. 
government is able to prove the unavailability of a witness, the Sixth Amendment 
includes a "rule of necessity" permitting use of prior testimony." Cook v. McKune, 323 
F.3d 825, 832 (10th Cir. 2003). "But because there is a real cost to the defendant in 
foregoing true confrontation, the unavailability requirement must be more than a 
formality." Id at 833. Nevertheless, "if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that 
affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may 
demand their effectuation." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74. "The ultimate question is @ 
whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to 
locate and present that witness. As with other evidentiary proponents, the prosecution 
bears the burden of establishing this predicate." Id., 448 U.S. 74-75. 
Federal courts view the Confrontation Clause to require a stronger showing of 
unavailability and reliability than does evidentiary Rule 804. Ecker v. Scott, 69 F.3d 69, 
72 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995). That is the law in Utah as well. "In a criminal case, the 
Confrontation Clause establishes a heavy burden on the prosecutor to exercise good faith 
efforts to produce the out-of-court witness." Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence, @ 
Unavailability: Unable to Procure Attendance [Rule 804(a)(5), p. 869 (2015-2016), citing 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). "The right to 
confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine @ 
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and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing 
@ is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, 
simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable 
cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While there may be some justification for 
holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing 
satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown [*726] to be 
actually unavailable, this is not, as we have pointed out, such a case." Barber v. Page, 
390 U.S. at 725-26. 
Utah courts apply a standard perhaps more stringent than its federal counterparts. 
i) "'(F)or a witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it must be practically impossible to 
produce the witness in court .... Every reasonable effort must be made to produce the 
witness.' This requires the proponent of the out-of-court statement to do his utmost to 
'procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means.' Utah R. Evid. 
804(a)(5)." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,r 15, 84 P.3d 1183, 1187 (Sup.Ct.) quoting 
State v. Webb, 779 P .2d 1108, 1113 (Utah 1989) ( citations omitted); accord State v. 
Drawn, 791 P .2d 890, 893 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that where the state had 
subpoenaed each witness three times prior to trial, these efforts were sufficient to 
demonstrate unavailability for purposes of the hearsay exception), cited by Mangrum & 
Benson on Utah Evidence, Unavailability of Declarant, [Rule 804(a)], supra, p. 867; State 
v. Barela, 779 P.2d 1140, 1142-43 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(" The State bears the burden of 
proving unavailability by competent evidence."). "Thus, in general, a witness will not be 
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found unavailable until the proponent of the evidence demonstrates that he has used all 
reasonable means at his disposal to secure the attendance of the witness." Montoya, at ,r @ 
16. 
A further question goes to the issue of when the State gave notice of the witness' 
likely absence. The timing of the State's notice in the instant case is suspect. Notifying 
the trial court on the first day of trial that a witness is "unavailable" is too late to allow 
for reasonable investigation. A recent decision from Massachusetts highlights the 
problem: 
Where a witness is unavailable due to illness or infirmity, the "good faith 
effort" required of the Commonwealth is to promptly inform the court and 
the defendant of the unavailability of the witness once the Commonwealth 
learns of it, so that they have an adequate opportunity to learn more about 
the witness's medical condition and to explore the alternative of a 
continuance or a deposition. Where the unavailability of the witness is not 
made known until the first day of trial, the defendant has little opportunlty 
to investigate the witness's medical condition to challenge the prosecutor's 
claim of unavailability. At that juncture, ordering a continuance or 
scheduling a deposition might be impracticable, effectively denying the 
defendant the possibility of these alternatives. 
Commonwealth v. Housewright, 470 Mass. 665, 674, 25 N.E.3d 273, 283 
(2015)( emphasis added). The impracticality in the instant matter of ordering a 
continuance is obvious, whereas if the State had notified court and counsel that the 
witness was in jail when that was learned, or had recently been released, defense counsel @) 
may have been able to locate and make their own provisions to secure the witness' 
attendance. 
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The Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the trial court exercised 
Ci> appropriate discretion in finding that the witness was unavailable under the 
circumstances, even under those circumstances set forth in the Court's opinion. Goins at 
11 12 - 13. Even with knowledge that a witness is available during substantial periods 
prior to trial ( although perhaps not immediately), no attempt was made to issue, properly 
serve a subpoena, the contents of which are not in the record, and secure and file a proper 
return, nor was there any attempt indicated in the record to notify the trial court or 
counsel in a timely manner of the witness' apparent unavailability. Accordingly, the 
witness should not be found unavailable. 
~ 
Mr. Goins was prejudiced by the trial court's finding and the Court of Appeals 
decision affirming it was error. Respecting an error involving the Sixth Amendment, this 
Court must be able to "confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Del. v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 
S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986). To hold a state constitutional error harmless under Utah Const. 
Art. I, § 12, the Utah State constitutional analog to the Sixth Amendment, it must, again, 
be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327,359 (Utah 
Sup.Ct. 1993) ("In other words, the side which benefited by the error (the prosecution) 
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict ( or 
sentence) obtained."). Where "the error in question amounts to a violation of a 
defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
@ States Constitution, its harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., reversal is 
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required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Villarreal, 889 
P.2d 419, 425 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1995) quoting State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 
1987) ( citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284, 89 S. Ct. 
1726 (1969)); see also State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,r 86 n.88, 299 P.3d 892, 922 
(Sup.Ct.). 
Obviously, without Mr. Estrada's testimony, there could be no conviction on 
Count III, the Threatening charge, as he was not only the alleged victim under that 
charge, but the only percipient witness. Erroneously finding Mr. Estrada to have been 
unavailable as a witness was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of 
Appeals erred holding the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding Estrada @ 
"unavailable." 
The prejudice does not end there, however. Mr. Estrada's testimony was also vital 
to the State's case, not only because he was the victim under Count III, but also because 
he corroborated Mr. Omar's testimony regarding the knife, Mr. Goins' behavior, and his 
motives when he was looking for Mr. Omar. "Confrontation Clause concerns are 
heightened and courts insist on more diligent efforts by the prosecution where a "key" or 
"crucial" witness' testimony is involved." McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 265-6 
(3rd Cir. 1999). For such an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different (rj 
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the jury's verdict. State v. 
Young, supra, 853 P.2d at 345. Presentation of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony 
at trial necessarily undermines confidence in the overall verdict. 
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C. PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT BE 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL. ALLOWING MR. ESTRADA'S 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY WAS PREJUDICIAL TO 
MR. GOINS. 
The Court of Appeals held with pnor precedent that the introduction of 
preliminary hearing testimony satisfies the confrontation clause and Utah R. Evid. 
804(b)(l)(B), because Mr. Goins was given the "opportunity" to confront the witness. 
Goins at, 17 citing State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245,, 18, 314 P.3d 1014 [Defendant 
was given ample opportunity to cross-examine the missing witness but declined to avail 
himself of the opportunity. "While ' [ d]efense counsel may have elected to forego cross-
examination[,] ... that does not mean that the opportunity was not available'." quoting 
State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986)]. 
The current authorities overlook the fact that the current nature of preliminary 
hearings precludes a defendant, both by Utah State Constitutional authority and, as a 
result of that authority, by common practice, from adequately or, perhaps more important, 
appropriately and sufficiently confronting and cross-examining a witness in at least an 
~ approximation of cross-examination at trial. Defense counsel objected to introduction of 
Estrada's testimony on the basis that the motive to cross-examine at preliminary hearing, 
was, and is, often entirely different from that at trial. Admitting that there was an 
"opportunity" to cross examine Estrada, Mr. Goins defense counsel stated, 
... that under 801 (b )( 1 )(b) it specifically states that you had an opportunity 
and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect examination 
and in these preliminary hearings there is an abbreviated procedure and 
quite frankly, Your Honor, the motive in developing testimony is different 
at a preliminary hearing than it is at trial. We frequently ask questions 
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during preliminary hearings that we would not ask at trial because evidence 
is admissible at . . . preliminary hearing but not necessarily admissible at 
trial. The rules of evidence are different and - or, or by the same token, we 
don't ask question that we might ask at a trial because credibility 
determinations are not being made at preliminary hearing. The Court 
making the probable cause determination is not assessing the credibility of 
a witness, therefore we do not ask those questions to get that information 
out. So I don't believe that the motive of developing that testimony is the 
same at a preliminary hearing as it would be at trial ... 
R.166:10 (emphasis added). 
The context and manner in which a defense attorney might cross-examine a 
witness during the course of a jury trial is likely to be very different from the manner in 
which cross-examination takes place, if allowed by the court, during preliminary hearing. 
It is simply inaccurate to give a blanket imprimatur upon preliminary hearing testimony, ® 
as the nature of a preliminary hearing is extremely different from that of a jury trial, or 
even of a bench trial. The preliminary hearing is constitutionally intended solely to be for 
the purpose of establishing probable cause. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 as amended 
1995. The Court of Appeals' warning in Goins to defense counsel to be prescient ("It 
may behoove defense counsel in such cases to take full advantage of any opportunity to 
cross-examine such witnesses,") Goins at n. 7., is essentially a directive for counsel to 
obtain a crystal ball. Given the fact that, in any given case, defense counsel may be 
completely precluded by the particular magistrate judge from cross-examining the 
witness on the basis that such examination will not assist the court in establishing 
probable cause, the effort to become a seer may be entirely wasted. Many judges take the 
position that if cross-examination is not in furtherance of establishing probable cause it is 
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objectionable and will, even sua sponte, disallow questioning beyond what may assist in 
@ establishing probable cause for a bind-over. "How does that help establish probable 
cause(?)," is a commonly asked question. Other judges will of course sustain a 
prosecutor's objection on the basis that a question goes beyond the scope of establishing 
probable cause. There is no constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses at 
preliminary hearings. State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, , 13, 218 P.3d 590. Reliable 
hearsay is allowed, evidence of prior bad acts, bad character evidence, and various 
matters which would be entirely extraneous at trial, may come in to evidence without 
objection, for the very reason that the preliminary hearing has such a limited 
~ constitutional purpose. 
For confrontation purposes, throughout Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
reference is made throughout to the "opportunity to cross-examine", rather than actual 
cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. passim. The "prior testimony exception" to the 
exclusion of out-of-court statements, specifically preliminary hearing testimony, applies 
"only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine." Id., 541 U.S. at 
57. Many State courts, however, have considered motive in determining whether to 
allow preliminary hearing testimony at trial. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 32 Mass. App. 
Ct. 570, 574-75, 591 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (1992)("In order to establish reliability, '[t]he 
prior testimony of the currently unavailable witness must have been given 'in a 
proceeding addressed to substantially the same issues as in the current proceeding, with 
@ reasonable opportunity and similar motivation on the prior occasion for cross-
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examination of the declarant by the party against whom the testimony is . . . offered,"' 
Quoting Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 393 Mass. at 532); State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, @ 
528-29, 328 P.3d 504, 508-09 (2014) (Identifying three non-exhaustive indicators of an 
"adequate opportunity," determined case-by-case, for cross-examination: 1. 
representation by counsel, 2. no significant limitation in any way in the scope or nature 
of cross-examination, 3. no new and significantly material line of cross-examination that 
was not touched upon in the preliminary hearing."); People v. Zapien, 4 Cal. 4th 929, 
975, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 147, 846 P.2d 704, 729 (1993) (A defendant's motive for 
cross-examining a witness during a preliminary hearing will differ from the motive for 
cross-examining that witness at trial. To be admissible at trial, these motives must be at @ 
least "similar."). In the instant matter, counsel conducted cross-examination of Estrada 
for discovery purposes but did not bother to object to testimony at the preliminary 
hearing. Estrada's statement that he moved out from living with Mr. Goins when his 
"bike ended up missing," R.202:16, strongly inferred that Mr. Goins stole it. This 
evidence, to which counsel objected at trial, R. was very objectionable, which defense 
counsel raised in terms of "evidentiary admissibility," the stolen bike inference, R.167 :3, 
to which the State responded, R.167:12. The prior "bad act" evidence may very well 
have had a substantial impact on the decision of the jury. The trial court allowed it, @ 
R.167: 16-17, and the Court of Appeals did not address the issue at all in its decision. 
This was error of a significant magnitude and raises the question of why some 
mechanism was not sought by the court to excise this particular statement from the (i) 
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recording played for the jury. Certainly it would not have been allowed had the witness 
@ been present, no curative jury instruction could have ameliorated the problem, and it 
badly eroded Mr. Goins' right of confrontation to have reasonably untainted testimony 
from a prior proceeding to be presented to the jury. Prior cross-examination must not 
only be full, but also fair. See discussion infra. For purposes or reiterating the testimony 
of Estrada at trial, therefore, prior cross-examination in the area of this prior bad act was 
not fair. It was error not to require that it be excluded. 
There are those jurisdictions, including case law in Utah, which have adopted a 
per se rule, e.g., State v. Brooks, infra. In rejecting such a position, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated, 
Some courts have adopted a per se rule that preliminary hearing testimony 
is admissible in a subsequent trial if the unavailability and opportunity to 
cross-examine requirements are satisfied. See State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 
(Utah 1981) ( cross-examination at trial and at preliminary hearing in same 
case take place under same motive and interest as matter of law); see also 
State v. Massengill, 99 N.M. 283,657 P.2d 139 (App.1983). These courts 
treat the "motive" issue primarily, if not entirely, as one of law. We decline 
to adopt such a rule, although it would be much easier for trial courts to 
apply. 
State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 862-63, 840 P.2d 400, 406-07 (Ct. App. 1992). The Idaho 
court in Ricks concluded that a case-by-case determination would allow the trial court to 
determine, as a matter of fact, whether the party opposing the use of such testimony "had 
an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination." Ricks 840 P .2d at 407. It should be pointed out that the Utah case 
@ referenced by Ricks in the above quotation, State v. Brooks, utilized the "sufficient 
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indicia of reliability" of the hearsay test. 638 P2d at 539. Brooks was decided well before 
Crawford v. Washington overruled Ohio v. Roberts on that very issue. "The Roberts test @ 
allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere 
judicial determination of reliability. It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed 
method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is very 
different from exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be a 
surrogate means of assessing reliability." Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. at 62. Since 
the Brooks decision was heavily rooted in the type of "reliability" determination, which 
Crawford soundly rejected in abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, the viability of Brooks and its 
per se determination of motive is heavily in doubt at the present time. 
There are numerous cases which hold that cross-examination at preliminary 
hearing need not be identical to that at trial, the opportunity must be "sufficient." 
State v. Outlaw, 216 Conn. 492, 499, 582 A.2d 751, 755 (1990)(using the rejected Ohio 
v. Roberts "reliability" test); People v. Zapien, supra, 846 P.2d at 729; Commonwealth v. 
Blazemore, 531 Pa. 582, 588, 614 A.2d 684, 687 (1992)["(T)he standard to be applied is 
that of full and fair opportunity to cross-examine."]. 
More recent authority, however, has taken a different approach, particularly 
where, as in Utah, the preliminary hearing is confined to establishing probable cause. @ 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 ("Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall @ 
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preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence ... "). The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated 
the following: 
In Wisconsin, a defendant has a statutory right at a preliminary hearing to 
cross-examine witnesses against him. Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5). However, the 
scope of that cross-examination is limited to issues of plausibility, not 
credibility. State ex rel. Huser v. Rasmussen, 84 Wis. 2d 600, 614, 267 
N.W.2d 285 (1978). This is because the preliminary hearing "is intended 
to be a summary proceeding to determine essential or basic facts" relating 
to probable cause, not a ''full evidentiary trial on the issue of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 396-97, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984)(emphasis added). 
Further clarifying, a more recent post-Crawford Wisconsin case stated, 
Cross-examination at a preliminary examination is not to be used ''for the 
purpose of exploring the general trustworthiness of the witness." Huser, 84 
Wis. 2d at 614. Indeed, "[t]hat kind of attack is off limits in a preliminary 
hearing setting." State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 605 N.W.2d 589 
(Ct. App. 1999). When this restriction is enforced, as it was in the present 
case, and the State attempts to use the preliminary hearing testimony at a 
later trial, a Confrontation Clause problem arises. 
State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ,I,I30-31, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 673, 695 N.W.2d 259, 265-
66( emphasis added). This highlights a pragmatic dilemma which dogs defense attorneys 
@ who wish to fully cross-examine but do not wish to push the preliminary hearing judge, 
or the prosecuting attorney, too far and have it cut off. The question is, how does one 
know if "full and fair cross-examination" will be allowed in a particular case without 
overstepping one's bounds? Defense attorneys are often walking on eggshells to ensure 
the magistrate judge does not cut them off and will truncate or curtail their examination 
accordingly. 
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Exploring areas of bias, motive to lie, and lack of credibility, matters not 
associated with "plausibility," are generally off limits in preliminary hearings in Utah, Ci 
which brings up an interesting equal protection issue. If some magistrates allow full and 
fair cross-examination and hew to a strict construction of Art I, § 12, such an arbitrary 
and capricious application of the Utah Constitution and the Rules of Evidence violates 
the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
requirement of the uniform operation of laws, Utah Const. Art. I, § 24. The uniform 
operation of laws clause "is at least as rigorous as the federal guarantee." State v. 
Houston, supra, ,I41, citing, inter alia, State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ,l33 n.5, 233 P.3d 476; 
accord Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, il 33, 54 P.3d 1069 (Sup.Ct.). ® 
Thus, presumably only analysis under Utah Const. Art. I, § 24 of the Utah 
Constitution is required. Whatever the case may be, given that hundreds of preliminary 
hearings are held each year in Utah, some magistrates and/or prosecutors allowing 
considerable latitude in cross-examination, some hewing to the principle that only the 
depths of plausibility and not credibility may be plumbed, there is a considerable question 
as to whether criminal defendants, separated into differing classes (those allowed full and 
fair cross examination with similar motive and interest, and those who are denied the 
opportunity) are being treated discriminatorily and the law, specifically Utah Const. Art. @ 
I, § 12, is being applied in a non-unifonn fashion, denying equal protection. 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. Art. I, § 
24. As was long ago explained, 
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"A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or 
exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation 
between classes or subject matter included as compared to those excluded 
from its operation, provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation 
to the purposes to be accomplished by the act. 
"In order to see whether the excluded classes or transactions are on a 
different basis than those included, we must look at the purpose of the act. 
The objects and purposes of a law present the touchstone for determining 
proper and improper classifications. 
"It is only where some persons or transactions excluded from the operation 
of the law are as to the subject matter of the law in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation that the law is discriminatory in the 
sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional. If a reasonable basis to 
differentiate tho.se included from those excluded from its operation can be 
found, it must be held constitutional." 
State v. J.B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 530, 116 P.2d 766, 769 (Sup.Ct. 1941) 
quoting State V. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 923, 924, 117 A. L. R. 330 (Sup.Ct. 
1938). This presents an extremely difficult issue to preserve at the trial level and should 
be considered. The fact cannot be ignored, however, that there is no rational basis for 
any differentiation between those who are allowed sufficient opportunity for cross-
examination at preliminary hearing and those who are not. The Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees all citizens equal protection of the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1 as does 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 24. For this reason alone, preliminary hearing testimony, which was 
@ obtained contrary to the strictures of the United States and State Constitutions, should be 
disallowed at trial. 
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People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004) presents the argument which Goins 
believes is the most persuasive in this area. A copy of People v. Fry is included in @ 
Addendum I. Some, not all, of the reasoning of Fry is set forth as follows: 
A preliminary hearing is limited to matters necessary to a determination of 
probable cause. The rights of the defendant are therefore curtailed: 
evidentiary and procedural rules are relaxed, and the rights to cross-
examine witnesses and to introduce evidence are limited to the question of 
probable cause. 
A defendant has no constitutional right to unrestricted confrontation of 
witnesses and to introduce evidence at a preliminary hearing. By rule, 
defendants have the right to a preliminary hearing under certain 
circumstances, and pursuant to the rule a defendant 'may cross-examine 
witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf.' Crim. 
P. 7(h)(3). However, the preliminary hearing is not intended to be a mini-
trial or to afford the defendant an opportunity to effect discovery. 
Hence, a preliminary hearing does not provide the same safeguards as a 
trial. 
Additionally, the judge's findings at a preliminary hearing are restricted to a 
determination of probable cause. A judge may not engage in credibility 
determinations unless the testimony is incredible as a matter of law .... if it 
is "in conflict with nature or fully established or conceded facts. It is 
testimony as to facts which the witness physically could not have observed 
or events that could not have happened under the laws of nature." Aside 
from the exceptionally rare instance of credibility as an issue of law, 
defense counsel has no legitimate motive to engage in credibility inquiries 
and may be prohibited from doing so. Thus, the right to cross-examination 
may be curtailed by the judge in all but the most unusual circumstances. 
Because credibility is not at issue and probable cause is a low standard, 
once a prima facie case for probable cause is established, there is little 
defense counsel can do to show that probable cause does not exist. 
Therefore, as a practical matter, defense counsel may decline to cross-
examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing, understanding that the cross-
examination would have no bearing on the issue of probable cause and that 
the judge may limit or prohibit the cross-examination. Thus we conclude 
that the opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is very 
limited. Further, the opportunity for cross-examination regarding the 
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credibility of a witness, as a matter of fact, exists only to the extent that an 
attorney persists in asking questions that have no bearing on the issues 
before the court, and such irrelevant questioning is not prohibited by the 
court. 
People v. Fry, 92 P.3d at 977(intemal citations omitted). "Thus," the Fry court 
concluded, "we have held that the preliminary hearing does not satisfy Confrontation 
Clause requirements." Id. "(W)e do not wish to change the scope of the preliminary 
hearing by overruling our decision in Smith that a preliminary hearing does not provide 
an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. As the Attorney General recognized in 
oral argument, Smith is good law; it prevents the preliminary hearing from becoming a 
mini-trial which would expend time and resources the judiciary does not possess." Id. at 
978. 
Considering the issue in the context of judicial resources, if every preliminary 
hearing becomes a "mini-trial," there may be little time left for judges to conduct actual 
trials. Bound separately as an Appendix is a printout obtained from Utah Court Data 
Services on October 21, 2016. There are 20,073 entries, virtually all felonies, for cases in 
<i 2015, wherein preliminary hearings were scheduled. The explanatory e-mail indicates 
that column F reflects the date the preliminary hearing was scheduled to be heard. If it 
was cancelled, column E indicates the date it was cancelled and column G reflects the 
reason. As is evident, few of those scheduled for hearing were cancelled. As the 
explanatory e-mail indicates, unless column E indicates the hearing was cancelled, it took 
place on the date indicated in column F (it is possible that the data does not indicate 
whether or not the preliminary hearing was held or waived). The vast majority of those 
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preliminary hearings, as reflected in column F, took place as scheduled, approximately 
70-75%.1 Assuming roughly 15,000 preliminary hearings resulted in mini-trials wherein ~ 
full and fair cross-examination, going to every facet of a witness' credibility and such 
sundry other matters as defense counsel wished to preserve for trial were to be allowed, 
somewhere in the vicinity of 45,000 hours of judicial time would be consumed.2 That is 
not an unfair estimate considering that counsel often forgo cross-examination of most 
witnesses entirely, as cross-examination would be both premature and would serve no 
useful purpose in frustrating the prosecution's ability to establish probable cause. 
Whether or not these figures and speculations are precise, it is entirely evident that it is 
impractical to allow full and fair cross-examination of each witness in every preliminary @ 
hearing held. 
There seems to be at least some agreement in the Court of Appeals that the issue is 
unsettling. See State v. Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ~ 17 n.3 ["(W)e are also not convinced 
that a preliminary hearing always provides the opportunity for cross-examination 
guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause .... "]. 
The State would have it both ways: a criminal defendant is provided the 
"opportunity" to fully and fairly confront the witness at preliminary hearing yet the 
purpose of a preliminary hearing is solely for the purpose of establishing probable cause. ® 
Those are diametrically opposed propositions. The two can only be reconciled if the 
1 . Counsel's best guess. 
2 . Again, just a conjecture on the part of counsel. An average of three hours per 
preliminary hearing would likely be required. 
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preliminary hearing court chooses to allow defense counsel ample latitude to cross-
~ examine in areas which may have nothing to do with establishing probable cause. Even 
then, it is questionable whether that sort of "opportunity" satisfies the needs of defense 
counsel when it comes time to cross-examine a witness before a jury at trial. 
Oftentimes, certainly more often than not, discovery is in its seminal stages. In 
order to meaningfully cross-examine, counsel must have all the information which would 
be available at trial. It is very troubling that one would feel compelled to cross-examine 
i) 
to the fullest extent possible, perhaps bringing forth inadmissible testimony or otherwise 
unfavorable testimony, without the benefit of discovery which would later be produced 
i> prior to trial. One court has determined that, "The adequacy of the opportunity to 
confront will be decided on a case-by-case basis, turning upon the discovery available to 
the defendant at the time and the manner in which the magistrate judge allows the cross-
examination to proceed." Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 337, 213 P.3d 476, 482 (2009). 
One must wonder how practical that is in terms of judicial resources. And again, it 
second guesses defense counsel, as well as the magistrate, to a considerable degree. 
With respect to rulings on hearsay, legal questions regarding admissibility are 
reviewed for correctness, questions of fact ... for clear error, and the final ruling on 
admissibility for abuse of discretion. State v. Garrido, supra, 314 P.3d at ,r 10. The Court 
of Appeals erred in finding that the witness was unavailable and that counsel had an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine at preliminary hearing, thus permitting admission 
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of the preliminary hearing testimony of Gabriel Estrada. For the reasons set forth, this 
Court should reverse and remand for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING RAISING NEW ARGUMENTS THAT TRIAL AND 
APPELLATE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
A. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION. 
The recorded preliminary hearing testimony of the victim of the Threatening with 
a Dangerous Weapon charge, Gabriel Estrada, R.202:2 - 13, was played for the jury. R. 
167:149. The defendant's cross-examination of Mr. Estrada raised no factual support for 
or issues of self-defense whatsoever. R.202: 9 - 13. Thus, this point goes only to Counts 
I and II of the Amended Information. 
The testimony of the primary victim, Jacob Omar, first brought forth the issue of 
self-defense on the part of the defendant during the State's direct examination. Factually, 
it arose on direct examination with the victim, Mr. Omar, indicating he was being 
questioned by Mr. Goins and his friend, Star, and that Mr. Omar was the initial aggressor: 
Next thing I knew just because being waken up in the middle of the 
afternoon to this nonsense, I see Desean stepping onto my blanket. I don't 
allow anybody to step onto my blanket. So I got up and I pushed him off 
my blankets. 
R.167:124-125. The defendant was then placed in a defensive position and reacted 
accordingly. R.167: 125-6. While the defense elaborated on the issue during cross-
examination, R.167:140-145, 146-150, the initial and primary testimony with respect to @ 
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the defendant's defense of self-defense was raised and developed by the State in its direct 
@ examination. R.167:124-139,145-146. 
The trial court ruled that sufficient evidence of self-defense was present to entitle 
the defendant to instruct the jury on the issue. R.167:217-218.3 During discussion of the 
proposed jury instructions, the subject arose of defendant's requested instruction 
discussing the burden and weight, inter alia, relative to self-defense. R.60, defense 
requested instruction is attached as Addendum J. The State objected to the instruction, 
but defense counsel insisted that it should be given as is. R.167:228-231. The trial court 
gave the instruction as written, "over the State's objection." R.167:231. The instruction, 
@ R.102, No. 24, is attached as Addendum K. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HA VE DECIDED THE MERITS OF 
THE PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
This subsection responds to the question of whether a petition for rehearing is an 
appropriate vehicle for addressing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, including 
prior appellate counsel. 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 35 states in pertinent part, "the petition (for rehearing) shall 
state with particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has 
overlooked or misapprehended . . . . " There was no claim that the Court 
3 "It is a subtle nuance but I am finding that there has been evidence that Omar pushed 
the defendant, that he was angry, he was intense, even his own admissions is that he was 
angry and that under the circumstances the defense has described which they may argue 
to the jury and it's for the trier of fact to determine if those are the circumstances, that at 
@ one point the defendant was on the bottom and Omar was on top and that is sufficient 
for some evidence to warrant the self-defense instruction." R.167:217-218. 
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"misapprehended" anything which was presented. The claim was that, due to the 
ineffective assistance of counsel of previously appointed appellate counsel, the Court of (i} 
Appeals "overlooked" an important issue. The rule itself places no restrictions upon 
why, i.e., the underlying reasons, the court may have "overlooked" an issue. It simply 
allows the consideration of something which was overlooked. 
The Petition for Rehearing itself was fully supported by the record, consistent with 
the record and briefing of the facts before this Court. It involved no extraneous facts, and 
provided the Petitioner with the guarantee of a meaningful appeal of the issue briefed in 
the Petition for Rehearing, and allowed the Court of Appeals ample latitude to provide 
for such further briefing and argument as desired. @ 
The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the merits of the Petition for Rehearing 
because the Petitioner has stated with particularity the points of law and fact, all 
contained within the record on appeal, which the Petitioner claimed the Court had 
"overlooked." It was the responsibility of Mr. Goins' initial appellate counsel to bring 
the matters to the court's attention. "The very premise of our adversary system of 
criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the 
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2045 (1984). Failing to provide @ 
adversarial testing as to a single issue, when that issue is critical to a finding of guilt, may 
in itself produce a breakdown in the adversarial process. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 664. 
"Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial @ 
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a reliable adversarial testing process." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 
@) Sup. Ct. 2052 (1984). Appellate counsel failed to "bring to bear such skill and 
knowledge as will render the (appeal) a reliable adversarial testing process." Id. 
The result of prior appellate counsel's ineffective assistance is that the Court of 
Appeals was caused to "overlook" the specific issue involved. Refusal of the court to 
rule on the Petition for Rehearing was a denial of the defendant's right to effective 
appellate counsel on appeal. The petitioner enjoys a constitutional right to appeal arising 
from article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 
1256 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1996) citing State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah Sup.Ct. 
@ 1985)("The Utah Constitution provides that a defendant in a criminal prosecution shall 
have a "right to appeal in all cases." Utah Const. art. I, § 12."). He is entitled to have 
counsel appointed and paid for at the appellate level. "The cost of appointed counsel for 
a party found to be indigent, including the cost of counsel and expense of the first appeal, 
shall be paid by the county in which the trial court proceedings are held." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-6-1111. It goes without saying that the Petitioner is entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel. Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, 1 48, 279 P.3d 396, 409 (Sup.Ct.); 
Landry v. State, 2012 UT App 350, 111, 293 P.3d 1092, 1096. "The Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures criminal defendants a right to effective assistance 
of appellate counsel." Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, 139, 175 P.3d 530, 539 (Sup.Ct.)4. 
4 For this proposition Lafferty cites Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 
@ Sup.Ct. 1996), which states as follows: 
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Initial defense counsel's error was caught early enough in the appellant process 
that the Court of Appeals could of swiftly and effectively dealt with the matter. This @ 
presented an excellent reason to litigate the issue in the Court of Appeals, rather than put 
it off to this Court, or more so, a post-conviction proceeding under the PCRA, assuming 
the defendant could obtain counsel to handle the matter or attempt to do it pro se ( always, 
at the least, problematic). 
Because the practical effect of a refusal by the Court of Appeals to entertain the 
merits of the Petition for Rehearing was to deny the effective assistance of counsel at that 
stage, the defendant timely brought the issue to the Court of Appeals' attention as a 
matter which, through no fault of its own, the court had "overlooked." Mr. Goins would ® 
be severely prejudiced by having to raise the issues presented in a subsequent proceeding 
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act. Because Mr. Goins, who is indigent, would 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the 
right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387, 396, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985). The standard 
for judging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as 
the standard for judging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 336 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 826 
P .2d 651 (Utah 1991 ); see also Tillman v. Cook, 85 5 P .2d 211, 221 
(Utah 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S. Ct. 706, 126 L. Ed. 
2d 671 (1994); State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
Under that standard, a defendant must show that his counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable conduct 
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Tillman, 
855 P.2d at 221 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). 
36 
not be entitled to counsel as a matter of right pursuant to a Post-Conviction Petition, his 
@ ability to even raise the issue presented at all would be severely limited, if not denied 
altogether. 
Furthermore, there are legitimate policy reasons for hearing the matter at the 
appellate court level, while it is still ripe, rather than shuffling it down the road with the 
hope that some good-hearted lawyer will take up the issue pro bono in a PCRA setting. 
The Sixth Amendment requires that an appellant be provided the effective 
assistance of counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 
2d 821 ( 1985)5. The Petitioner timely raised that issue in the Court of Appeals. It is not 
@ necessary for the Court of Appeals to detour from the direct application of Utah R. App. 
P. Rule 35. The issue was "overlooked" by the Court. The reason it was overlooked is 
precisely why Mr. Goins was required to request a rehearing. His right to counsel was 
abridged by his original appellate attorney. Rehearing was the efficient, fair, just, and 
judicially economic forum for the issue presented to be heard. Rehearing should have 
5 "In bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal defendant is 
attempting to demonstrate that the conviction, with its consequent drastic loss of 
liberty, is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant must face an 
adversary proceeding that -- like a trial -- is governed by intricate rules that to a 
layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant -- like an 
unrepresented defendant at trial -- is unable to protect the vital interests at stake. 
To be sure, respondent did have nominal representation when he brought this 
appeal. But nominal representation on an appeal as of right -- like nominal 
representation at trial -- does not suffice to render the proceedings constitutionally 
adequate; a party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in 
no better position than one who has no counsel at all." 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. at 396. 
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been granted. 
This Court addressed this very issue, in the context of a petition for certiorari, ~ 
where the issue of prior appellate counsel's ineffective assistance was raised for the first 
time on certiorari. The Court held that, while unusual, it should hear the issue. It stated 
as follows: 
The State is correct that ordinarily a claim of ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel must be raised in a postconviction proceeding, as provided for in 
rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Obviously, such a proceeding 
would usually be the first opportunity to advance that claim. However, this 
case presents the unusual situation where the claim of ineffectiveness of 
appellate counsel is being raised in a second tier of appellate review by new 
appellate counsel. If we were to require defendant to present the claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel in a postconviction 
proceeding in the trial court, we are not aware of any evidence or 
argument which might be made that is not now before us. We therefore 
conclude that in these peculiar, narrow circumstances, we should now 
address defendant's claim and not require him to raise it later in a 
postconviction proceeding in the trial court. Judicial economy will be 
served thereby. (Emphasis added). 
State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah Sup.Ct. 199l){emphasis added). 
Furthermore, rehearing is not inconsistent with current practice under Utah R. 
App. P. Rule 23B. "A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to @ 
remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate 
court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. That 
mechanism . is available in order to expose the inadequacies of counsel at the trial level 
even after the matter is on appeal. There is nothing inconsistent then with giving similar 
consideration to an error made by appellate counsel timely brought to the Court's 
attention at the appellate level on a petition for rehearing. Compared to a Rule 23B 
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remand, evidentiary hearing in the trial court, and revisiting the issue on appeal, it is far 
~ less time consuming, requires no additional fact finding, and provides the 
defendant/appellant the constitutional guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel 
throughout his appeal. 
Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in granting a petition for 
certiorari in State v. Humphries, supra, 818 P.2d at 1029, and for the reasons stated in the 
premises, Court of Appeals should have granted a rehearing and ruled on the merits of 
Mr. Goins' Petition for Rehearing. 
C. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 24 IS AN INCORRECT STATEMENT OF THE 
LAW WHICH MISLED THE JURY AND PREJUDICED THE 
DEFENDANT. 
Whether jury instructions correctly state the law is a question of law. State v. 
Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ,r 6, 122 P.3d 566. Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Liti, 2015 UT App 186, ,r 8, 355 P.3d 1078. Mr. Goins' initial appellate counsel 
in the Court of Appeals failed to raise this issue, which undersigned counsel then 
requested the Court of Appeals address by way of his Petition for Rehearing. 
Jury instruction No. 24 states as follows: 
You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to 
establish self defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. 
The laws of Utah do require the defendant to bring forward some evidence 
which tends to show self-defense. If the defendant has done this, and if 
such evidence of self-defense, when considered in connection with all other 
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt or 
if it raises a reason to believe that the defendant acted in self-defense, then 
you must find him not guilty. (Emphasis added) 
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an 
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acquittal if there is any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt. 
R. l 03 ( emphasis added). The emphasized language constitutes an incorrect statement of 
the law. 
Contrary to this jury instruction, the defendant bears no burden whatsoever to ® 
establish self-defense. This Court has stated, "( t )he trial court made clear that Jackson 
did not bear the burden to establish self-defense and that 'if there was a reasonable doubt 
as to whether [the] defendant did or did not act in self-defense, then the jury should 
acquit."' Jackson v. State, 2014 UT App 168, 14, 332 P.3d 398, 400 citing State v. Knoll, 
712 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1985). The defense has no burden to present any factual basis 
of self-defense whatsoever. Whether the facts establishing self-defense come from the 
State's case or from the defendant's is immaterial. Either the facts are present, regardless 
of their genesis, or they are not. The law was made clear in State v. Knoll: 
In sum, when there is a basis in the evidence, whether the evidence is 
produced by the prosecution or by the defendant, which would provide 
some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a killing was done to 
protect the defendant from an imminent threat of death by another, an 
instruction on self-defense should be given the jury. And if the issue is 
raised, whether by the defendant's or the prosecution's evidence, the 
prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
killing was not in self-defense. State v. Starks, Utah, 627 P.2d 88, 92 
(1981); State v. Torres, 619 P.2d at 695; State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 
(1977). (emphasis added) 
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. The instruction in Knoll indicated that, "if the 
prosecution's evidence did not tend to show self-defense, then the defendant must "bring 
forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense" to avail himself of that @ 
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defense." Id. at 215. That is not what trial counsel's proposed instruction stated here. It 
@ stated blankly and inaccurately that, "The laws of Utah to require the defendant to bring 
forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense." R.60. The trial court used 
that very instruction. R.103. Its language places the burden solely upon the defendant to 
bring forward self-defense evidence. The defendant bears no such burden. The law 
plainly requires the State to prove the defendant's guilt, including eradicating any 
reasonable doubt as to the defense of self-defense, regardless of the source of any facts 
supporting that defense. Of course, as the Court in Knoll further noted, 
As a practical matter, a defendant may have to assume the burden of 
producing some evidence of self-defense if there is no evidence in the 
prosecution's case that would provide some kind of evidentiary foundation 
for a claim of self-defense. But there need only be "sufficient evidence of 
[the defendant's] justification to create in the minds of the jury a reasonable 
doubt of his culpability for the offense charged" to justify the giving of an 
instruction on the point. State v. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 199 P. 145, 147 & 
148 (1921). See also State v. Starks, supra, at 92; State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 
at 695. If the jury concludes that there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a 
defendant acted in self-defense, he is entitled to an acquittal. State v. 
Wilson, Utah, 565 P .2d 66 (1977); State v. Jackson, Utah, 528 P .2d 145 
(1974). 
Knoll, 712 P .2d at 215. The Court in Knoll concluded its holding on the issue with this 
black letter statement of the law: 
The trial court made clear in its instructions that the defendant had no 
burden to adduce evidence of self-defense for the defense to be considered; 
that the jury should consider the defense of self-defense, whether the 
evidence thereof was presented by the prosecution or the defendant; that 
the burden of proof remained on the prosecution throughout the case; and 
that if the jury entertained a reasonable doubt about whether defendant 
acted in self-defense, it should acquit. On the basis of these instructions, we 
conclude that there was no error. (Emphasis added) 
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Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215 (emphasis added); accord State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r 25, 192 
P.3d 867 ("When a criminal defendant requests a jury instruction regarding a particular @ 
affirmative defense, the court is obligated to give the instruction if evidence has been 
presented--either by the prosecution or by the defendant--that provides any reasonable 
@ 
basis upon which a jury could conclude that the affirmative defense applies to the 
defendant."); State v. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, ,r 74, 352 P.3d 107 ("The instruction 
clearly conveyed that the jury should consider any evidence of self-defense, that the 
burden of proof remained with the State at all stages of the trial, and that if the jury 
entertained a reasonable doubt about whether defendant acted in self-defense, it should 
acquit."); Jackson v. State, 2014 UT App 168, ,r 4, 332 P.3d 398 {"The trial court made @ 
clear that Jackson did not bear the burden to establish self-defense and that 'if there was a 
reasonable doubt as to whether [the] defendant did or did not act in self-defense, then the 
jury should acquit."'); State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38, ,r 15, 248 P.3d 70 ("Rather, a 
defendant is entitled to an affirmative defense instruction so long as there is a reasonable 
basis in the evidence for such a defense."). 
Many states agree with the proposition that if the jury is not instructed clearly on 
the burden of proof of self-defense, the omission constitutes plain error.6 Here the jury 
6 See e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 27 V.I. 332, 949 F.2d 677, 680 
(3rd Cir. 1991) (applying Virginia state law); Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 675 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Janes, 982 P.2d 300,303,304 (Colo. 1999); Coley 
v. State, 220 Ga. App. 468, 469 S.E.2d 513, 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Raines v. 
State, 79 Haw. 219, 900 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Haw. 1995); State v. Evans, 278 Md. 
197, 362 A.2d 629, 635 (Md. 1976); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 
352 N.E.2d 203, 206-08 (Mass. 1976); Infantolino v. State, 414 A.2d 793, 795-97 
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may well have concluded that, since the defendant did not "bring forward" the facts 
@ constituting self-defense in the first instance, rather those facts were brought forward by 
the State in its direct examination, that the defense was not entitled to such a defense. 
D. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,r 56, 150 P.3d 480. Counsel's deficient performance 
must be prejudicial - i.e., affecting the outcome of the case. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, ,r 19, 12 P.3d 92. 
The record in the trial court reflects that the self-defense jury instruction, which 
Ci was discussed at great length, was defective and would have been misleading to the jury. 
R.167: 229-231. By requesting an instruction containing an incorrect and misleading 
statement of the law regarding the burden in establishing self-defense, defense counsel 
allowed the State a free pass in its burden to prove the defendant guilty. It has been held 
that when obvious defenses are ignored in lieu of those which are ostensibly weaker, the 
presumption of effective assistance of counsel may be overcome. See, e.g., Gray v. 
Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (C.A.7 1986). Defense counsel did not ignore self-defense 
entirely, however, counsel ignored the importance of allowing the burden of bringing 
~ (R.I. 1980); State v. Green, 538 N.W.2d 698, 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Barone v. State, 
858 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Nev. 1993); State v. Parish, 1994 NMSC 72, 878 P.2d 988, 994-95, 
118 N.M. 39 (N.M. 1994) and State v. Acosta, 1997 NMCA 35, 939 P.2d 1081, 1087-88, 
123 N.M. 273 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, 575 N.W.2d 658, 
664-65 (N.D. 1998); State v. Summers, 120 Wn.2d 801, 846 P.2d 490, 499-501 (Wash. 
1993). 
State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ,r 19 n.6, 18 P.3d 1123. 
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forth the supporting facts to be shouldered solely by the defendant. This was both 
negligent and prejudicial and supports a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The possibility that counsel was employing some sort of strategy is simply 
implausible under any of the circumstances of this case. It is understood that, in order to 
overcome the presumption of that the apparent failure of counsel to request a jury 
instruction, there must be a demonstrable "lack of any conceivable tactical basis for 
counsel's actions." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Depriving 
the defendant of what can only be considered an avenue of defense, by misplacing the 
burden on the defendant to establish self-defense, is not a tactical decision. It is a default, 
® 
a failure which falls below a reasonably objective standard of professionalism. @ 
Accordingly, "counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 
Litherland, , 19. The likelihood of a different. outcome is sufficiently high to undermine 
confidence in the verdict. See State v. King, 2010 UT App 396,, 23, 248 P.3d 984. In 
consequence of which, the defendant should be entitled to a new trial. 
E. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL. 
Appellate counsel argued only one issue in his brief on appeal: "Whether the trial 
court erred in finding witness Estrada unavailable under Rule 804 and pennitting his 
preliminary hearing testimony." See Brief of Appellant, Argument, passim. Appellate @ 
counsel did not raise the issue of the flawed self-defense instruction. 
It is the law that counsel's failures on appeal, which prejudices a criminal 
defendant on appeal, are cognizable under the standard set forth in Strickland v. 
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A person convicted of a crime is 
@ entitled to effective assistance of counsel in his first appeal of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387, 394, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985). The general standard for judging 
performance of counsel established in Strickland also applies to claims of ineffective 
appellate counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 120 S. Ct. 746, 145 L. Ed. 2d 
756 (2000). To prevail on a claim that appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, 
it must be shown that appellate counsel unreasonably failed to discover and assert a non-
frivolous issue and establish a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on this 
issue on appeal but for his counsel's deficient representation. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285-86. 
This Court has stated, 
If trial counsel's deficiencies were prejudicial, appellate counsel's failure to 
raise those deficiencies is necessarily prejudicial in the same way and to the 
same extent. The prejudice from Landry's claim that appellate counsel was 
deficient in failing to assert on appeal trial counsel's ineffective 
representation is therefore implicit in his argument that he was prejudiced 
by trial counsel's deficient performance. Thus, Landry has pleaded a prima 
facie case of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and it was error to 
dismiss that aspect of his petition for failure to state a claim. 
Landry v. State, 2012 UT App 350, 1 11, 293 P.3d 1092. To establish a meritorious 
claim based on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the defendant must 
demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, that this deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of his trial, 
and that the appellate counsel failed to raise the issue. See Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 
UT 73, 1 41 n.5, 267 P.3d 232 ("with respect to each prong of Strickland a habeas 
petitioner arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise a claim on appeal 
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must demonstrate ( 1) that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue which was obvious 
from the trial record and (2) that the issue is one which probably would have resulted in @ 
reversal on appeal.); Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ,r 44, 293 P.3d 345 ("And [a]s is the case 
in challenges to the effectiveness of trial counsel, to prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must prove that appellate counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable conduct and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced [him]." ( alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ,r 211, 344 P.3d 581. ("(T)he Strickland 
two-part test applies. But we have further held that where a petitioner argues that 
appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim, the petitioner @ 
"must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether appellate 
counsel overlooked an issue which is obvious from the trial record and . . . which 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal.). 
F. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE ON THE MERITS, REVERSE 
AND REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
In the instant matter, for the reasons above stated, appellate counsel's conduct fell @ 
below the standard of practice required of defense counsel in failing to bring to bear the 
skill and expertise required of defense counsel, and was therefore deficient. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. The likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high 
to undermine confidence in the verdict. See State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ,r 23, 248 
P.3d 984. In this regard, it should be borne in mind precisely what the standard is: 
(T)houghtful reflection suggests that confidence in the outcome may be 
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undermined at some point substantially short of the "more probable than 
not" portion of the spectrum. 
State v. Knight, 734 P .2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). The likelihood of a different result 
"more probable than not" in this particular case. "To merit reversal of his conviction, (a 
defendant) must also demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by trial counsel's 
deficient performance-that there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result 
absent the error. State v. Liti, supra, 2015 UT App at 121. It is clear that both trial and 
@ appellate counsels' error prejudiced the defendant. Trial and appellate counsels' error 
created a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome sufficiently high to undermine 
confidence in the verdict and this Court's decision to require reversal and a new trial. 
This Court should reverse and remand this matter for a new trial because of the erroneous 
jury instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Desean Michael Goins respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the Court of Appeals convictions of Aggravated Assault and remand 
@)) the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this A day of ___ --...b_--"---· 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
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JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES 
JAMES Z. DAVIS1 and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred. 
ORME, Judge: 
1. Judge James Z. Davis began his work on this case as a member 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court, but 
thereafter became a Senior Judge. He completed his work on this 
case sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See 
generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6). Judge Davis, a member 
of this court from 1993 until late in 2015 when he became a 
senior judge, passed away on February 27, 2016. Judge Davis 
was twice our presiding judge and three times our 
representative on the Judicial Council. More importantly, he was 
an esteemed colleague and good friend. His wit, wisdom, and 
dedication will be sorely missed. 
State v. Goins 
'Ill Desean Michael Goins (Defendant) was convicted of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015), and threatening with or 
using a dangerous weapon in a fight, a class A misdemeanor, see 
id. § 76-10-506. 2 Defendant now appeals both convictions, 
arguing that the trial court erroneously found that a witness was 
unavailable and allowed the witness's prior testimony to be used 
against Defendant on that basis. Because there was no error in 
the trial court's determination of unavailability, and because 
Defendant had the opporhmity to cross-examine the witness 
when he gave his prior testimony, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
':1(2 One morning in July 2013, Defendant and his girlfriend 
set off on a search in downtown Salt Lake City with a very 
specific goal: to find a homeless man (Witness) whom Defendant 
believed had stolen his cell phone. They found Witness outside a 
homeless shelter for men. With knife in hand, Defendant 
confronted Witness, who denied taking the phone and hurried 
away. 
'Il3 The couple then made their way to Pioneer Park, a 
traditional haunt of Salt Lake's homeless denizens, where one of 
Witness's friends (Victim), also a homeless man, was sleeping on 
his blanket. Defendant's girlfriend woke Victim and asked if he 
had seen Witness. Defendant, waving the knife he still carried, 
complained that Witness had stolen his phone. When Defendant 
2. Although some of the statutes cited in this opinion have been 
amended since July 2013, when the incident giving rise to the 
charges against Defendant occurred, the amendments do not 
affect our analysis. Accordingly, for ease of reference we cite the 
most recent codification of the statutes. 
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encroached on Victim's personal space, Victim pushed 
Defendant off the blanket. An altercation ensued, during which 
Defendant bit off Victim's earlobe. Both men stood up and 
squared off once again, and Defendant then retrieved his knife, 
which he had dropped during the scuffle, and stabbed Victim 
under the left arm. Soon thereafter, police arrived and arrested 
Defendant. Defendant was later charged in connection with the 
assault of Victim and the brandishing of the knife against 
Witness. 3 
<JI:4 Prior to the preliminary hearing, the prosecution asked 
Salt Lake City police bike patrols to locate Victim and Witness. 
The officers were able to locate both men, who spent much of 
their time together, "based primarily on a description of 
[Victim's] missing earlobe," even though they did not have a 
description of Witness. Victim and Witness arrived together at 
the preliminary hearing with a pastor from a church both men 
regularly visited. The prosecution seized the opportunity to keep 
more regular contact with both men through the pastor, 4 a man 
who had the trust of both Witness and Victim. 
3. Defendant was also charged with-and acquitted of-the 
felony of mayhem, nearly forgotten outside the confines of first-
year Criminal Law in law school. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 
(LexisNexis 2012) (Every person who unlawfully and 
intentionally deprives a human being of a member of his body, 
or disables or renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the 
tongue, puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of 
mayhem."). Despite the rarity of mayhem convictions in modem 
times, they are not unheard of. See, e.g., State v. Fairclough, 44 
P.2d 692, 692-93 (Utah 1935) (affirming conviction for mayhem). 
4. By the time of the trial, the pastor had left the state for a new 
position. Because both the pastor and his successor affirmed that 
service was made on both Witness and Victim, and because the 
(continued ... ) 
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':115 The prosecution regularly followed up with the pastor 
and emailed him the trial information for him to pass along to 
Witness and Victim. The pastor verified that the two men 
received the notification. A few weeks before trial, the pastor 
informed the prosecution that Witness had gotten into some 
trouble, been jailed, and fallen out with Victim. After receiving 
this information, the prosecutor contacted the jail, but Witness 
had already been released. From that time forth, neither Victim 
nor the pastor, both of whom knew Witness well and could 
recognize him by sight, saw or heard from Witness, and no one 
saw Witness with his former friends or in his former hang-outs. 
On the eve of trial, the prosecution contacted the jail to see if 
Witness was incarcerated again, but he was not. 
':116 Trial was scheduled to begin on October 23, 2013, but was 
continued one day because no jury had been called for that date. 
At that time, the prosecution asked the trial court to declare 
Witness unavailable because Witness did not appear for trial and 
the prosecution was unable to locate him. The prosecution also 
asked the trial court to admit Witness's preliminary hearing 
testimony during the trial. Over an objection raised by 
Defendant's counsel that Witness "was not 'unavailable,"' the 
trial court granted the motion and indicated that it would allow 
the preliminary hearing testimony at the rescheduled trial. At 
trial, which began the following day, the jury convicted 
Defendant of aggravated assault, for the attack on Victim, and of 
threatening with a dangerous weapon during a fight, for his 
confrontation of Witness. Defendant appeals, and we affirm. 5 
( ... continued) 
prosecution utilized the second pastor in the same manner as the 
first, we use II the pastor" when referring to either of the two 
pastors. 
5. Although Defendant apparently appeals both the conviction 
related to the assault of Victim and the one for brandishing the 
(continued ... ) 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
<_117 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding 
Witness to be unavailable under rule 804 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and in permitting Witness's preliminary hearing 
testimony to be admitted under that rule as prior testimony. 
"We review the district court's evidentiary rulings under an 
abuse of discretion standard. However, error in the district 
court's evidentiary rulings will result in reversal only if the error 
is harmful." Anderson v. LarnJ H. Miller Commc'ns Corp., 2015 UT 
App 134, en 17, 351 P.3d 832 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). "The district court's decision to admit testimony 
that may implicate the confrontation clause is also a question of 
law reviewed for correctness." State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, en 8, 232 
P.3d 519. 
ANALYSIS 
en8 We note, preliminarily, that a statement is hearsay if 
(1) the witness made the statement outside of the current trial or 
hearing and (2) a party offers the statement "to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted in the statement." Utah R. Evid. 801(c)(l)-
(2). Hearsay is inadmissible, unless an exception applies. See id. 
R. 802. It is the interpretation and application of one such 
( ... continued) 
knife against Witness, we agree with the State that Witness's 
testimony was relevant only to the charge relating to Witness. 
Witness was not a witness to the assault of Victim and offered no 
testimony on that point at the preliminary hearing; therefore, 
even were we to discern an error in the presentation of Witness's 
preliminary hearing testimony to the jury-which we do not, see 
infra enen 12-15, 18-20-we would still affirm Defendant's assault 
conviction because the alleged error would be harmless as to 
that charge. 
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exception -the admission of prior testimony by an unavailable 
potential witness-that we address in this opinion. See id. R. 
804(b)(l). 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding That 
Witness Was Unavailable. 
19 Utah law requires that the party offering evidence in the 
form of witness testimony make reasonable efforts to procure the 
witness's testimony at trial. Id. R. 804(a)(5). "[C]onstitutional 
unavailability is found only when it is 'practically impossible to 
produce the witness in court.' ... [E]very reasonable effort must 
be made to produce the witness." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
402 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). 
<_[10 But "[a] good faith search does not mean that every le.ad, 
no matter how nebulous, must be tracked to the ends of the 
earth." Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1974) 
( determining that the prosecution was under no obligation to 
investigate vague claims that one prosecution witness had 
"moved to somewhere in the state of New York" and that 
another "was said to have applied for employment with the 
Santa Fe Railway in the 'midwest"'). In essence, although a party 
must make every reasonable effort to procure the in-court 
testimony of the witnesses that the party wishes to use, the party 
is not, as the State puts it, required to do "everything humanly 
possible" to do so. Thus, "Rule 804(a)(5) does not require a 
patently futile attempt to serve a subpoena on a potential 
witness ... whose physical location and address are completely 
unknown." Brown v. Harry Heathman, Inc~, 744 P.2d 1016, 1018 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). See also State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645--46 
(Utah 1995) (holding that State's efforts to locate witness were 
reasonable where it contacted United States Marshal's Office, 
which had an outstanding warrant for arrest of witness, and 
where federal officials "could not provide any concrete 
information as to his present location, other than that he might 
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be found in Mexico or southern California"), abrogated by statute 
on other grounds as recognized by Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, 
'I[ 70, 267 P.3d 232. 
<_[11 In State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we 
concluded that the prosecutor's efforts to obtain two witnesses' 
testimony were reasonable. In that case, the prosecution 
subpoenaed the witnesses three times before trial; spoke with 
and was assured of the presence of one witness at trial by that 
witness's mother; visited the last known address of the other 
witness, but discovered that the witness had moved without 
leaving a forwarding address; questioned police informants; and 
searched police files for evidence of the whereabouts of the 
missing witness. Id. at 893. Under such circumstances, we held 
that the prosecution's "efforts compl[ied] with the hearsay 
exception unavailability requirements." Id. On the other hand, in 
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that the prosecutor's efforts to locate a witness 
were unreasonable and the witness was not unavailable "where 
efforts to secure the witness's attendance [were] cursory, where 
the party had clear indications that the witness would not attend 
or where the party had obvious means of obtaining those 
indications but neglected to do so." Id. at 1122. See also id. at 
1124-25 ( affirming the district court, nonetheless, because the 
district court's improper admission of the testimony was 
harmless error). 
<Jr 12 The instant case is much more like the events in Drawn 
than those discussed in Chapman. As in Drawn, but unlike in 
Chapman, the prosecution in this case went to considerable effort 
to obtain Witness's testimony at trial. Prior to the preliminary 
hearing, the prosecution sent out police bike patrols to locate 
Victim and Witness, and the officers located both men, even 
though they were part of Salt Lake City's large homeless 
population, based mostly on Victim's unfortunate lack of one 
earlobe. There was nothing as distinctive in Witness's 
appearance, but luckily for the prosecution, Witness was often in 
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the company of Victim. The two were homeless, presenting 
obvious challenges to staying in touch, but when Victim and 
Witness arrived together at the preliminary hearing with the 
pastor, whom both men trusted, the prosecution seized upon the 
opportunity to use the pastor as a vehicle for staying in more 
regular contact with both men. The prosecution followed up 
regularly with the pastor and emailed him Defendant's trial 
information. And the pastor verified that the two men 
personally received this notification. 
<_[13 A few weeks before trial, however, the pastor informed 
the prosecution that Witness had gotten in some trouble, been 
jailed, and fallen out with Victim. After receiving this 
information, the prosecutor contacted the jail, but Witness had 
already been released. From that time forward, neither Victim 
nor the pastor saw or heard from Witness, and Witness was no 
longer found with his former friends or in his former haunts. It is 
far from clear that he even remained in Utah. 6 Thus, although 
the prosecution did not re-enlist the police bike patrols to locate 
Witness, it did not need to. It had no idea where to send the 
6. Research shows that not only are homeless people 
more mobile than the population at large but that a 
significant percentage of homeless individuals engage in 
interstate migration, Peter H. Rossi, Down and Out in 
America: The Origins of Homelessness 126 (The University of 
Chicago Press 1989). See also Jennifer Amanda Jones, 
Problems Migrate: Lessons from San Francisco's Homeless Population 
Survey, Nonprofit Quarterly (June 26, 2013), available at 
http://nonprofitquarterly.org/2013/06/26/problems-migrate-
lessons-from-san-francisco-s-homeless-population-survey/ 
[https://perma.cc/JHE8-7QS2] ("Almost 40% of San Francisco's 
homeless population became homeless in a city other than San 
Francisco. Most (24%) hail from California, but many (15%) from 
around the United States."). 
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patrols, and the police would have been unlikely to recognize 
Witness when not in the presence of Victim. Realistically, the 
pastor and Victim were more likely to spot Witness than were 
randomly dispatched bike patrols. Additionally, on the eve of 
trial, the prosecution also contacted the jail to see if Witness 
might once again be incarcerated. They learned he was not. 
<j(l 4 Whether the prosecution II could have done more to 
ensure . . . [Witness] showed up for the trial" is not the issue; 
instead, we consider whether the prosecution's efforts were 
reasonable. As the State noted, "[a] good faith search does not 
mean that every lead, no matter how nebulous, must be tracked 
to the ends of the earth," Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th 
Cir. 1974), and we conclude that the State acted reasonably even 
though "[Witness] could [neither] be located nor produced in 
court," Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894. 
<Jl:15 Indeed, the instant case is, in our estimation, an even 
stronger case for affirmance than Drawn because here Defendant 
acquiesced in both the method of keeping tabs on Witness and in 
the means of serving him notice of the trial. First, the prosecution 
told the magistrate at the preliminary hearing that the pastor 
was the best way to stay in contact with Witness. If Defendant 
had an objection to this method of communication as a substitute 
for more formal service, unusual though it may have been, the 
time to contest it was not at trial but at the preliminary hearing 
when it was first proposed. Where "there is 'apparent[] if not 
complete acquiescence [in] what the court did as a matter of 
procedure,' '[n]either party is in a position to complain as to 
[that] procedure' on appeal." Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291, 
<j( 14 n.9, 364 P.3d 60 (alterations in original) (quoting Hodges v. 
Smoot, 125 P.2d 419, 421 (Utah 1942)). Second, Defendant 
explicitly accepted the prosecution's proffer of its efforts to get 
Witness to appear. For example, although Defendant faults the 
trial court for "not even attempt[ing] to get testimony from the 
pastor regarding the service to [Witness]," in doing so he ignores 
the fact that the trial court offered him the opportunity to get 
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such testimony from the pastor-an opportunity that he 
declined. Because the prosecution made reasonable efforts to 
locate Witness, though perhaps not all efforts "humanly 
possible,11 we agree with the trial court that the prosecution 
acted in good faith, and we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding Witness to be unavailable for 
purposes of rule 804. 
II. Witness's Testimony Was Properly Admitted Under Rule 804. 
CJ[16 If the potential witness is unavailable, prior testimony 
may be admitted if the witness gave the testimony "as a witness 
at a ... hearing,11 Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(l)(A), and the testimony is 
11 offered against a party who had ... an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination,11 
id. R. 804(b)(l)(B). Because a preliminary hearing is a "hearing" 
under rule 804(b )(1 )(A), the introduction of preliminary hearing 
testimony may be allowed in lieu of the in-court testimony of the 
witness if the court finds the potential witness to be unavailable. 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 1981). Rule 804(b)(l)(B) 
essentially incorporates the requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause of the United States Constitution. See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004) (holding that the 
Confrontation Clause does not II allow[] admission of testimonial 
statements of a witness who [does] not appear at trial unless he 
[is] unavailable to testify, and the defendant ha[s] had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination11 ). It is instructive that in 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that if a witness is unavailable, preliminary 
hearing testimony is admissible under the Confrontation Clause 
because the circumstances of a preliminary hearing 
closely approximat[e] those that surround the 
typical trial. [The witness is put] under oath; 
respondent [i]s represented by counsel ... ; 
respondent ha[s] every opportunity to cross-
examine [the witness] as to his statement; and the 
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proceedings [a]re conducted before a judicial 
tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of 
the hearings. 
Id. at 165. The Court determined that, under such circumstances, 
a party opposing introduction of preliminary hearing testimony 
"had an effective opportunity for confrontation." Id. 
<J[17 Regarding the requirement that a party be given "an 
opportunity" to develop the testimony of the witness, Utah R. 
Evid. 804(b)(1)(B), the rule refers to the opportunity to examine 
the witness, not to whether the defendant actually availed 
himself of that opportunity, State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 
4:[ 18, 314 P.3d 1014. The opportunity for cross-examination 
"satisfie[ s] the requirements of [ the Constitution and the Rules of 
Evidence]." Id. <JI 20. This principle is well-established in Utah 
law, predating even the codification of the Rules of Evidence. 
See, e.g., State v. King, 68 P. 418, 419 (Utah 1902) ("By taking the 
testimony of the witness ... in the presence of the accused upon 
the examination at a time when he had the privilege of cross-
examination, this constitutional privilege is satisfied, provided 
the witness cannot, with due diligence, be found .... The 
constitutional requirement of confrontation is not violated by 
dispensing with the actual presence of the witness at the trial, 
after he has already been subjected to cross-examination by the 
accused[.]"). 
<]l18 During the preliminary hearing, Defendant had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Witness; indeed, he admits as 
much in his appellate brief. It is therefore irrelevant whether trial 
counsel voluntarily elected to forgo some aspect of cross-
examination due to counsel's strategy.7 Garrido, 2013 UT App 
7. Defendant makes much of the fact that the prosecution knew 
procuring Witness's testimony at trial would be more difficult 
than in the typical case because Witness was a homeless person. 
(continued ... ) 
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245, <_[ 18. Indeed, forgoing or minimizing cross-examination at a 
preliminary hearing is a common practice among the defense 
bar.8 But Defendant was not denied the opportunity to cross-
examine Witness. 
( ... continued) 
True enough. But like the prosecution, defense counsel knew 
that Witness was homeless. Defense counsel was likewise aware 
that the prosecution might have difficulty in securing the 
testimony of Witness and Victim at trial. In such a context, 
defense counsel could have anticipated that Witness and/or 
Victim might not be physically present at trial and that, if 
deemed unavailable, their testimony would be read for the jury. 
In the case of homelessness and similar circumstances-such as 
where a potential witness is terminally ill, seriously mentally ill, 
suicidal, a known drug addict, or an active-duty soldier who 
may be called up for combat deployment -there is a distinct 
possibility that the witness may vanish or otherwise become 
unavailable before trial. It may behoove defense cormsel in such 
cases to take full advantage of any opportunity to cross-exarrrine 
such witnesses. Then, if the testimony is read at trial, counsel's 
cross-examination is part of what will be read, and the jury will 
have a less one-sided version of the witness's testimony. 
8. Justice Brennan, writing in dissent in California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149 (1970), the case in which the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that preliminary hearing testimony may be 
admissible under the prior testimony hearsay exception, id. at 
165, articulated several reasons for this common practice, id. at 
197 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted, 
First ... the objective of [a preliminary] hearing is 
to establish the presence or absence of probable 
cause, not guilt or innocence proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt; thus, if evidence suffices to 
establish probable cause, defense counsel has little 
reason at the preliminary hearing to show that it 
(continued ... ) 
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<J[19 As noted previously, however, hearsay testimony is 
admissible under the prior testimony exception if, and only if, 
the party offering the evidence can show that the party opposing 
the introduction of the evidence had both "opportunity and 
similar motive to develop it." Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(l)(B) 
(emphasis added). To this end, Defendant, relying upon 
persuasive authority only, attempts to convince this court that 
( ... continued) 
does not conclusively establish guilt .... Second, 
neither defense nor prosecution is eager before trial 
to disclose its case by extensive examination at the 
preliminary hearing; thorough questioning of a 
prosecution witness by defense counsel may easily 
amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the State. 
Third, the schedules of neither court nor counsel 
can easily accommodate lengthy preliminary 
hearings. Fourth, even were the judge and lawyers 
not concerned that the proceedings be brief, the 
defense and prosecution have generally had 
inadequate time before the hearing to prepare for 
extensive examination. Finally, though counsel 
were to engage in extensive questioning, a part of 
its force would never reach the trial factfinder, who 
would know the examination only second hand. 
Id. See also Right of Confrontation: Substantive Use at Trial of Prior 
Statements, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 108, 114 (1970) (characterizing as 
"troubling" "the [Supreme] Court's use of . . . preliminary 
hearing testimony" at trial, on the ground that "it had been 
subject to cross-examination," because "[g]enerally, there is little 
motivation for comprehensive cross-examination at a 
preliminary hearing"). Whatever the truth of these sentiments, 
they are not reflected in Utah law, see supra <j[ 18; therefore, 
members of the defense bar might do well to heed our 
suggestions in appropriate cases, see supra <J[ 18 note 7. 
20140009-CA 13 2016 UT App 57 
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when "[t]rial counsel ... initially questioned [Witness], at the 
preliminary hearing, . . . she did not have [the] same motive as 
she would have had at trial." Defendant further states that "[t]he 
purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine probable cause, 
not [to] prov[e] the cause beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the 
cross-examination may not have been as thorough because they 
are only focusing on the basis for the arrest." We are not 
unsympathetic to this argument, but the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly foreclosed it in State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), 
which is overlooked in Defendant's briefs on appeal. 
<:1(20 Dismissing as meritless arguments identical to those raised 
by Defendant in this case, our Supreme Court concluded in 
Brooks that "counsel's motive and interest are the same in either 
[the trial or preliminary hearing] setting; he acts in both 
situations in the interest of and motivated by establishing the 
innocence of his client. Therefore, cross-examination takes place 
at preliminary hearing and at trial under the same motive and 
interest." Id. at 541. Thus, adhering to the rationale of Brooks, we 
determine that Defendant's challenge is unavailing, and we 
affirm the decision of the trial court to admit Witness's 
preliminary hearing testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
<:1(21 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 
Witness's preliminary hearing testimony when it found that 
Witness was unavailable to testify because, under the 
circumstances, the State made reasonable efforts to procure the 
testimony of Witness at trial. Because Defendant had an 
appropriate opportunity to cross-examine Witness, Witness's 
testimony from that hearing was admissible under rule 804. 
<:1(22 Affirmed. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS 
DOB: 11/29/1990, 
AKA: DESEAN GOINS, MOSELY, 
DESEAN MOSELY,DESEAN 
GOINSMOSLEY 
746 NORTH 900 WEST APT 105 









Case No. 131906358 
The undersigned Deputy District Attorney upon a written declaration states on 
information and belief that the defendant, DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS, committed the crime(s) 
of: 
COUNT 1 
MAYHEM, 76-5-105 UCA, Second Degree Felony, as follows: That on or about July 05, 2013 
at 350 South 400 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did unlawfully and 
intentionally deprive a human being of a member of his or her body, or disable or render it 
useless, or cut out or disable the tongue, or put out an eye, or slit the nose, ear, or lip. 
COUNT2 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 76-5-103(1) UCA, Third Degree Felony, as follows: That on or 
about July 05, 2013 at 350 South 400 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did 
commit assault as defined in Utah Code Section 76-5-102 and used 
18 
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DAO# 13014430 
Page2 
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
COUNT3 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 76-5-103(1) UCA, Third Degree Felony, as follows: That on or 
about July OS, 2013 at 350 South 400 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did 
commit assault as defined in Utah Code Section 76-5-102 and used 
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
J BRIERLEY, J BRIERLEY, RICHARD BRYSON, MICHAEL CARDWELL, 
GABRIEL ESTRADA, CHRIS HOLDING, JUSTIN HUSDON, HOKU LIi LIi MANUEL-
DIZON, DONALD MEYERS, JACOB OMAR, ROBERT SHORT, JARED ZARGOZA, 
DECLARATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE: 
This Information is based upon the following: 
The statement of Officer Cardwell of the Salt Lake City Police Department that on July 5, 
2013, he responded to the Pioneer Park located at 350 West 400 South in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on a report of a fight in progress. Upon arrival, Officer Cardwell was flagged down by 
Donald Meyers who stated that he saw a male hitting another male in a green shirt. Mr. Meyers 
stated that he saw the first male stab the male in the green shirt with a knife. Mr. Meyers stated 
that the argument was over a cell phone. 
Officer Cardwell located Jacob Omar in Pioneer Park and found that he had a stab wound 
and part of his ear missing. Mr. Omar stated that a male approached him and they got into an 
argument. Mr. Omar stated that the male accused him of stealing his phone and grabbed a knife 
and stabbed him. Officer Cardwell located Mr. Omar's earlobe on the ground where the incident 
occurred. Mr. Omar was transported to the hospital for treatment. 
Officer Mortensen located defendant DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS walking away from 
the park at 180 West 400 South in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Defendant GOINS had some 
small cuts on his face and admitted that he had a knife in his bag. Officer Mortensen removed a 
black handled kitchen knife from defendant GOINS bag. The defendant admitted post-Miranda 
to Officer Mortensen that he had been in an altercation with Mr. Omar and that he bit Mr. 
Omar's ear and grabbed his knife and stabbed him with it. 
@ 
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Sgt. Hudson responded to the area to assist and a male identified as Gabriel Estrada 
began yelling at the defendant. Sgt. Hudson approached Mr. Estrada who stated that he saw that 
Mr. Omar had been stabbed and knew that defendant GOINS had stabbed him. Mr. Estrada 
stated that the defendant approached him prior to the incident with Mr. Omar and threatened to 
stab him with a knife while accusing him of stealing his phone. Mr. Estrada stated that he feared 
for his safety and left the area. Mr. Estrada described the knife which matched the knife found in 
the defendant's bag. 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
SIM GILL, District Attorney 
@ Deputy · ct Attorney 
18th da of July, 2013 
MAH /DAO# 13014430 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-705 
(2008) I declare under criminal penalty of the State 
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the 











Document:Utah R. Evid. Rule 804 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 804 
Copy Citation 
Current with rules received through September 1, 2016. 
Utah Court Rules STATE RULES UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE ARTICLE VIII. 
HEARSAY 
Rule 804. Exceptions to the rule against hearsay -- When the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness 
{a) Criteria for being unavailable. -- A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a 
witness if the declarant: 
(1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement because the court rules that a privilege applies; 
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so; 
(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter; 
(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a 
then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or 
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been 
able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant's attendance. 
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement's proponent procured or 
wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the 
declarant from attending or testifying. 
(b) The exceptions. -- The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
10/19/2016 10:47 AM 
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(1) Former testimony. -- Testimony that: 
(A} was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given 
during the current proceeding or a different one; and 
(B} is now offered against a party who had -- or, in a civil case, whose 
predecessor in interest had -- an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by 
direct, cross-, or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under the belief of imminent death. -- In a civil or criminal case, a 
statement made by the declarant while believing the declarant1s death to be 
imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. -- A statement that: 
(A} a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the 
person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the 
declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to 
invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant 
to civil or criminal liability; and 
(B} is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its 
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability. 
( 4} Statement of personal or family history. -- A statement about: 
(A} the declarant's own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, 
relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, 
even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about that 
fact; or 
(B} another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the 
declarant was related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so 
intimately associated with the person's family that the declarant's information is 
likely to be accurate. 
History 
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Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2004; December 1, 2011 
• Annotations 
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
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Document:Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 14 
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 14 
Copy Citation 
Current with rules received through September 1, 2016. 
Utah Court Rules STATE RULES UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 14. Subpoenas 
(a) Subpoenas requiring the attendance of a witness or interpreter and production or 
inspection of records, papers, or other objects. 
(1) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter before a court, 
magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution 
may be issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed, the prosecuting 
attorney on his or her own initiative or upon the direction of the grand jury, or the 
court in which an information or indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court in 
which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the defendant, without charge, as 
many signed subpoenas as the defendant may require. An attorney admitted to 
practice in the court in which the action is pending may also issue and sign a 
subpoena as an officer of the court. 
(2) A subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to appear and 
testify or to produce in court or to allow inspection of records, papers or other 
objects, other than those records pertaining to a victim covered by Subsection (b). 
The court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable. 
(3) A subpoena may be served by any person over the age of 18 years who is not a 
party. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the witness or 





officer shall serve any subpoena delivered for service in the peace officer's county. 
(4) Written return of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to the court and 
to the person requesting that the subpoena be served, stating the time and place of 
service and by whom service was made. 
(5) A subpoena may compel the attendance of a witness from anywhere in the state. 
(6) When a person required as a witness is in custody within the state, the court 
may order the officer having custody of the witness to bring the witness before the 
court. 
(7) Failure to obey a subpoena without reasonable excuse may be deemed a 
contempt of the court responsible for its issuance. 
(8) Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state, or is so ill or infirm as 
to afford reasonable grounds for believing that the witness will be unable to attend a 
trial or hearing, either party may, upon notice to the other, apply to the court for an 
order that the witness be examined conditionally by deposition. Attendance of the 
witness at the deposition may be compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall be 
present at the deposition and the court shall make whatever order is necessary to 
effect such attendance. 
(b) Subpoenas for the production of records of victim. 
(1) No subpoena or court order compelling the production of medical, mental health, 
school, or other non-public records pertaining to a victim shall be issued by or at the 
request of the defendant unless the court finds after a hearing, upon notice as 
provided below, that the defendant is entitled to production of the records sought 
under applicable state and federal law. 
(2) The request for the subpoena or court order shall identify the records sought 
with particularity and be reasonably limited as to subject matter. 
(3) The request for the subpoena or court order shall be filed with the court as soon 
as practicable, but no later than 28 days before trial, or by such other time as 
permitted by the court. The request and notice of any hearing shall be served on 
counsel for the victim or victim's representative and on the prosecutor. Service on an 
unrepresented victim shall be made on the prosecutor. 
(4) If the court makes the required findings under subsection (b)(l), it shall issue a 
subpoena or order requiring the production of the records to the court. The court shall 
10/lR/?016 1·16 PM 
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then conduct an in camera review of the records and disclose to the defense and 
prosecution only those portions that the defendant has demonstrated a right to 
inspect. 
(5) The court may, in its discretion or upon motion of either party or the victim or 
the victim 1s representative, issue any reasonable order to protect the privacy of the 
victim or to limit dissemination of disclosed records. 
(6) For purposes of this rule, "victim'' and 11 victim 1s representative 11 are used as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(2). 
( c) Applicability of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The provisions of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, shall govern the content, 
issuance, and service of subpoenas to the extent that those provisions are consistent with 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
History 
Amended effective November 1, 1996; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2007; November 1, 2015 
• Annotations 
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
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Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 
Copy Citation 
Current through the 2016 3rd Special Session 
Utah Code Annotated Constitution of Utah Article I Declaration of Rights 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
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Utah Const. Art. I, § 24 
Copy Citation 
Current through the 2016 3rd Special Session 
Utah Code Annotated Constitution of Utah Article I Declaration of Rights 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
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Utah R. App. P. Rule 35 
Copy Citation 
Current with rules received through September 1, 2016. 
Utah Court Rules STATE RULES UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 35. Petition for rehearing 
(a) Petition for rehearing permitted. -- A rehearing will not be granted in the absence of 
a petition for rehearing. A petition for rehearing may be filed only in cases in which the 
court has issued an opinion, memorandum decision, or per curiam decision. No other 
petitions for rehearing will be considered. 
(b) Time for filing. -- A petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14 days 
after issuance of the opinion, memorandum decision, or per curiam decision of the court, 
unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. 
(c) Contents of petition. -- A petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14 
days after issuance of the opinion, memorandum decision, or per curiam decision of the 
court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. The petition shall state with 
particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked 
or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the 
petitioner desires. Counsel for petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
(d) Oral argument. -- Oral argument in support of the petition will not be permitted. 
(e) Response. -- No response to a petition for rehearing will be received unless 




requested by the court. Any response shall be filed within 14 days after the entry of the 
order requesting the response, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A petition for 
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a request for a response. 
(f) Form of petition. -- The petition shall be in a form prescribed by Rule 27 and shall 
include a copy of the decision to which it is directed. 
(g) Number of copies to be filed and served. -- An original and 6 copies shall be filed 
with the court. Two copies shall be served on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
(h) Length. -- Except by order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any response 
requested by the court shall not exceed 15 pages. 
(i) Color of cover. -- The cover of a petition for rehearing shall be tan; that of any 
response to a petition for rehearing filed by a party, white; and that of any response filed 
by an amicus curiae, green. All brief covers shall be of heavy cover stock. There shall be 
adequate contrast between the printing and the color of the cover. 
(j) Action by court if granted. -- If a petition for rehearing is granted, the court may 
make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may restore it to the 
calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such other orders as are deemed 
appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case. 
(k) Untimely or consecutive petitions. -- Petitions for rehearing that are not timely 
presented under this rule and consecutive. petitions for rehearing will not be received by 
the clerk. 
(I) Amicus curiae. -- An amicus curiae may not file a petition for rehearing but may file a 
response to a petition if the court has requested a response under subparagraph (e) of 
this rule. 
History 
Amended effective October 1, 1992; April 1, 2004; June 1, 2010; November 1, 2014 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF PTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: patd 
Prosecutor: BLAYLOCK, ROGER s 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SINGLETON, 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 29, 1990 
Sheriff Office#: 367909 
Audio 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 131906358 FS 
Judge : ANN BOYDEN . 
Date: December 9, 2013 
LACEY C 
Tape Number: S42 Tape Count: 917-936 
CHARGES 
·2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/25/2013 Guilty 
3. THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS WEAPON IN FIGHT (amended) - Class A 
Misdemeanor · 
Pleai Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/25/20·13 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is ~uspended. 




Based on the defendant's conviction of THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS 
WEAPON IN FIGHT a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced 
to a term of 180 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Printed: 12/09/13 09:35:18 Page 1 
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Case No: 131906358 Date: Dec 09, 2013 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE @ 
Credit for Time Served from 7-5-13 
Attorney·Fees · Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary .conditions required by Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
@ 
If supervised by Adult Probation and Parole: all fines, fees and/or 
restitution are to be paid directly to Adult Probation and.Parole. 
Violate no laws. · @ 
No contact with victim(s). 
Undergo asse·ssment to determine appropriate counseling. Enter and 
successfully complete any recommended treatment. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling or 
treatment as directed by probation agency. 
Comply with all ~tandard drug and alcohol conditions imposed by 
probation agency. @ 
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor 
associate-with any persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol 
or illega1 drugs. 
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise 
distributed illegally .. 
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the 
request of any law enforcement officer and/or probation agent. @ 
No spice, ivory wave or items of that nature. 
Submit to random UA's and/or ETG testing. 
Submit to s·earch of person and/or property upon the request of any 
law enforcement officer. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Not to po$sess alcohol nor frequent places where alcohol is the 
chief item of sale. @> 
Obtain a mental health evaluation and successfully complete any 
recommended treatment. 
Defendant to take medications as prescribed. 
Complete T.R.C as Directed by AP&P 
Evaluations to be Completed Within 60 Days of Release 
No Contact With Witnesses 
Printed: 12/09/13 09:35:18 Page 2 
1 .,f " 
.-...., 
Case No: 131906358 Date: Dec 09, 2013 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS, 
Defendant. 
custody: Salt Lake county Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: mandya 
Prosecutor: DEESING, ANDREW K 
Defendant 
MINUTES ~ 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
: case No: 131906358 FS 
Judge: ANN BOYDEN 
Date: July 14, 2014 
Defendant•s Attorney(s): SINGLETON, LACEY C 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of.birth: November 29, 1990 
Sheriff Office#: 367909 
Audio 
Tape Number: S-42 Tape Count: 10:50-11:00 
CHARGES 
2 ., AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/25/2013 Guilty 
3. THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS WEAPON IN FIGHT (amended) - Class A 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/25/2013 Guilty 
HEARING 
TIME: 10:50 AM This case comes before the court on an Order to 
Show Cause hearing .. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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begin with picking the jury tomorrow morning because we will 
have been able to address all preliminary matters today, 
okay? 
What is the preliminary motion that you wish to 
address at this time? 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, the preliminary motion is 
this, Gabriel Estrada who is the listed victim in Count 3, we 
have gone to some lengths to try to procure his attendance 
here today -
THE COURT: Proffer those efforts for me, please. 
MR. LEAVITT: And what those - as an offer of proof, 
Your Honor, what those efforts were was about a month ago -
in order to procure his attendance at the preliminary 
hearing, both of these witnesses in this case are homeless. 
Their address is a shelter and so as the Court knows, there's 
a very transient nature to that and it's sometimes hard to 
locate people. In order to do that for the preliminary 
hearing what we did is we contacted the Salt Lake City Bike 
Police and were able to find them mostly based on Jacob 
Omar's appearance because as a result of this case he has a 
missing earlobe. They were able to do that and when they did 
that Mr. Estrada and Mr. Omar both came to the preliminary 
hearing. When they did so they brought a person they 
referred as their pastor whose name was Russ. He's part of 





























charge of community outreach, so a lot of his, a lot of his 
job and a lot of his responsibilities dealt with, you know, 
getting to know the people in the area, watching out for 
the~, helping them out, helping them through the process. 
Russ was the person who was the contact 'cause, of course, 
these two homeless people don't have cell phones or any way 
that I can contact them regularly. Russ had brought them to 
the prelim and I had spoke with Russ and spoke with them at 
the prelim and asked them if it's okay if I go through Russ 
to contact them and let them know when we get a trial date 
and they agreed to that, both Mr. Estrada and Mr. Omar did 
that. I kept in contact with Russ and I had emailed him a 
subpoena. Russ informed me - and I emailed that subpoena 
about a month ago. Russ informed that he did have the 
opportunity to serve both Mr. Omar and Mr. Estrada those 
subpoenas letting them know the court date and letting them 
know that they needed to be here. Now, he since that time 
I maintained some contact with Russ just to make sure that he 
tabs on them as the trial was getting closer. Russ left that 
job for another job and his replacement, Jason, whose here 
today with Mr. Omar, they're in the conference room. He was 
kind of taking over for Russ and was aware of the situation, 
was able to verify that indeed Russ did serve the subpoena on 
Gabriel Estrada. They both informed me that in the last few 
weeks Mr. Estrada has come into some trouble. He was in jail 
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at one point. I checked the jail yesterday, he's not there 
now, he was actually released on September 24th. We checked 
it again about a week ago and I checked yesterday to see if 
he'd been returned to jail, he's not. So he's not in jail at 
this point. 
Mr. Omar and the community pastor have let me know 
that they've lost touch with him. I guess Mr. Omar and Mr. 
Estrada have kind of had a falling out and so they were 
concerned that he may not be here today. He did have a 
subpoena, he did know about the court date but - and again, 
Jason, the new community outreach person, I had him watching 
for Gabriel the last couple of days to see if he saw him to 
make contact with him. He did not. He said he doesn't run 
around in that area any_more and he's kind of involved with a 
different crowd, but again, his whereabouts are unknown. 
Our position, Your Honor, is that we have - he's 
been served by process and we've gone to additional means to 
try to find this witness, he's unavailable and so again, this 
is going to take a two-part test. So I'm just addressing 
unavailability now and so the Court asked for a proffer of 
what we've done, that's what we've done to try to procure his 
attendance, he's not here today. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to address 
different steps or do you want - that's fine. 
MR. LEAVITT: And we can address unavailability and 
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then if we get to there I think we can address the rule. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. VENABLE: Your Honor, I'll address -
THE COURT: Mr. Venable then. 
MR. VENABLE: In the United States Supreme Court 
and the Utah Courts have held that the right to confront 
witnesses at trial and to provide the fact finder an 
opportunity to access their credibi~ity, cannot be lightly 
dismissed. I know the Court of Appeals in State v. Tron said 
that for a witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it 
must practically impossible to produce the witness in court 
and, you know, in this case, in State v. Tron, they found 
that the witness was unavailable but that was because the 
D.A. subpoenaed that witness three times, they had their 
detective on the case search for him, go to the last known 
addresses. They had the detective, you know, calling family 
members. Detective search consisted of questioning police 
informants, searching police files and working with Salt Lake 
County investigators to try and procure the attendance of 
that witness. You know, in this case the subpoena wasn't 
even served by, you know, a member of the police or the 
attorney's office, it was emailed to a pastor and then passed 
along. That's just simply not enough to meet the prong of 
unavailability. 































Any further response on that? 
MR. LEAVITT: Our response, Your Honor, is simply 
as far as different cases that have addressed the issue, in 
Brown vs. Heathman, the 1987 case in Utah, in that one they 
didn't even try to serve the person because they didn't they 
were here because they didn't know where they were and so 
they didn't even serve them and the Court in that case - and 
I have copies for counsel [inaudible]. 
In that case, Your Honor, you can simply look at 
page, Page 3 it just says at the very bottom of that 
Paragraph 2 at the very bottom, (inaudible) in order to show 
an inability of attendance of a witness the opponent must -
of prior testimony must always attempt service of process. 
But then it talks about other reasonable means and does not 
require (inaudible) attempt to serve a subpoena on a witness. 
We served a subpoena on the witness here. We've gone further 
than this. 
As far as the notion that when we start arguing 
ability to cross examine and confront a witness, again, we'll 
get to that when we get to the prior testimony but the issue 
that that raises is whether or not Mr. Goins has had the 
opportunity to confront and cross examine the witness. What 
we are asking the Court to offer is prior preliminary hearing 
testimony. Ms. Singleton who is his attorney now had the 




























had an opportunity to confront him about everything that's 
going to be coming in. There was a complete cross 
examination. There were not even any objections made and the 
Court didn't stop the cross examination, the Court didn't 
limit the cross examination. Defense was able to cross 
examine him and ferret out any truth or bias or anything that 
they wanted to do and that's what he's entitled to 
constitutionally. He was given that right at the preliminary 
hearing, it's a complete transcript. That's what we're 
asking to offer. 
Under - I suppose now is probably as good a time as 
any to talk about where we're offering the exception which is 
804(b) (1) which is former testimony and indeed it is 
testimony that was given at a hearing and is now offered 
against the party who had an opportunity and similar motive 
to develop and cross and redirect examination which they were 
able to do. 
As far as his right to confront a witness, he's had 
that right with this testimony. We're not offering an 1102 
statement, we're not offering an out-of-court statement. It 
was a statement that was made in court, at a prior proceeding 
in this case under oath in which Mr. Goins had ample 
opportunity to confront and cross examine the witness. 
Again, are there more things that we could do? 





























to try to find that person but that's not what we're required 
to do under the rule. The requirement is that the Court is 
persuaded that we have acted in good faith, with reasonable 
diligence to try to locate a witness and we've been unable to 
do so. We have done that. The one person who I had contact 
with, with this homeless man, I maintained that contact. He 
served him a subpoena. Mr. Estrada has that subpoena and 
he's not here. The rule says that if the person is served, 
that they're absent from the trial and we've not been able to 
get them by process, that's what that subpoena is. He was 
served in process. That's it. We don't even get to 
reasonable·means. We've gone above that and tried to go to 
other reasonable means to locate people who know him and try 
to find him but we've been unable to do that. But it doesn't 
matter because he was served a subpoena. He's not here today 
and we've done what we can to get him here. Again, the 
confrontation right has been fulfilled, we're offering 
preliminary hearing testimony and nothing else. 
THE COURT: Do you want to address the 
confrontation issue? 
MS. SINGLETON: Yes, Your Honor I can address that 
issue. Your Honor, the Supreme Court of Utah has held that 
the (inaudible) confrontation law does not apply to 
preliminary hearings and although, under the rules for the 






























an opportunity, a prior opportunity to cross examine the 
witness which, yes, there was a preliminary hearing in this 
case and yes, we did have the opportunity to cross examine 
Mr. Estrada, I would submit that that is - that would still 
violate my client's right to confront and cross examine the 
witnesses against him by admitting this testimony at trial. 
The reason being that under 804(b) (1) (b) it specifically 
states that you had an opportunity and similar motive to 
develop it by direct, cross, or redirect examination and in 
these preliminary hearings there is an abbreviated procedure 
and quite frankly, Your Honor, the motive in developing 
testimony is different at a preliminary hearing than it is at 
trial. We frequently ask questions during preliminary 
hearings that we would not ask at trial because evidence is 
admissible at trial - or at a preliminary hearing but not 
necessarily is admissible in a trial. The rules of evidence 
are different and - or, or by the same token, we don't ask 
question that we might ask at a trial because credibility 
determinations are not being made a preliminary hearing. The 
Court making the probable cause determination is not 
assessing the credibility of a witness, therefore we do not 
ask those questions to get that information out. So I don't 
believe that the motive of developing that testimony is the 
same at a preliminary hearing as it would be at trial and 
therefore it would violate my client's right to confront and 
10 
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cross examine the witnesses against him by admitting this 
testimony, the preliminary hearing testimony at trial. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. LEAVITT: May I just briefly address the Sixth 
Amendment issue? The fact the Supreme Court said that that 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation would not apply to 
prelim, that's being used in reverse here. What they're 
saying is that you don't get every single witness at a 
preliminary hearing. You don't get to have that right to 
confront them. Now, when they're there and you've confronted 
them, that right to confrontation has been fulfilled. But 
what that case is saying is it's saying that reliable hearsay 
can be admitted at a preliminary hearing and you can't insist 
on every single witness being at a preliminary hearing, not 
the reverse. It's not that you don't have that right, that 
right may be fulfilled at the preliminary hearing, it's just 
that they can't necessarily assert that right at a 
preliminary hearing, and again, as we know, as a matter 
(inaudible} every - in this instance had I objected to say, 
Hey, these are questions about credibility, this is beyond 
the scope of this hearing and Ms. Singleton had been shut 
down, I can see how possibly they didn't get a complete cross 
examination. But as we know, as a matter of course, every 
cross examination at every single prelim, we talk about 































of these things that she's saying they don't have a motive to 
do but that's what the cross examination at preliminary 
hearing is about. They had an opportunity to confront that 
witness, it's been fulfilled and so the testimony should be 
admitted. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
I'm going to address first of all the initial prong 
of whether or not this witness is actually unavailable and 
the parties have been willing to do as I ask, to just go on 
proffer of what the State has done. Are both parties willing 
to accept those proffers with out contesting the proffers of 
what they've done to serve him without bringing in the -
without hearing from Jason I guess is who the witness we have 
here. Are you willing to accept those proffers as far as the 
availability issue goes? 
MS. SINGLETON: I'll accept the proffer, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right and I do find that based on 
the proffer of what the State has done to procure this 
witness's testimony, that he is unavailable under Rule 804 as 
far as that first prong goes. 
The key for that for me is that he knew about when 
this hearing was, I mean, whether the service is actually 
done by law enforcement officer or a pastor or a friend or a 






























delivered by mail, the key is is I cannot find fairly that 
someone is unavailable if they really do not know when this 
trial is. All indications are that this person, even before 
he was in jail and released from jail on September 24th was 
aware of this court date and had, in fact, come to a 
preliminary hearing, so knew the proceeding was going. I am 
finding that for the requirements of Rule 804 - and we are 
dealing specifically with subsection A, sub-5 in this case, 
that the State did do reasonable means of process and, in 
fact, due process has actually occurred as far as trying to 
get Mr. Estrada here and he is not here. He has not 
appeared. This is the time set for this hearing, in fact 
we're an hour past the time when he would have been 
subpoenaed to have come in and meet with them and he is not 
present. 
As we go to the next prong and that is the next 
part of this analysis, argument has been made that the right 
to confrontation is met if the defendant, defense counsel or 
opposing counsel of the witness has had an opportunity to 
cross examine under circumstances that would provide a 
similar motive. That is what's key here, was it the same 
type of a cross examination and opportunity that it meets the 
criteria needed for Rule 804? I have not read the 
preliminary hearing. Has that been given to me and I just 
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weren't able to do if they were in trial and sometimes that 
changes the circumstances. So my understanding is we do have 
the jury pool gathering right now. Have you received a list 
of how many? 
CLERK: We called in 46 and there are 8 no-shows. 
THE COURT: And I know that we didn't need as many 
as we had originally scheduled in for yesterday. I had 
called in more than usual because of the number one setting 
on yesterday's calendar was a domestic violence case and that 
sometimes takes more. That's a lot put on the record just to 
clarify. I know that each of the parties want the benefit of 
the record. Where are we now as far as requests for looking 
to different timings? How we're going to proceed with the 
evidence? 
It was your request, Ms. Singleton, that started, 
what is the defense's position right now. 
MS. SINGLETON: Your Honor, I believe - well - and 
again not knowing when you referenced how long the next date 
would be and we have discussed with Mr. Goins what our 
position is and I think he understands why we are requesting 
a continuance. Our main issues, Your Honor, are - well, there 
are two, I guess, one being that again this was scheduled for 
a 2-day trial. We had subpoenaed our witness for yesterday 
and today and she is still scheduled to work tomorrow and so 
our concern is that if this were to run into a second day for 
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whatever reason that we would be precluded from having our 
witness available. 
And secondly, upon further sort of consideration of 
the issue of the testimony that will be admitted from the 
preliminary hearing, there are things that we would need to 
address with that in terms of the evidentiary admissibility 
of some of that testimony. And I think our issue yesterday 
that we objected to were based on grounds of the 
confrontation clause and 804. Today our issue would be with 
respect to some evidentiary concerns with things that were 
said in that preliminary hearing that would not otherwise be 
admissible at trial. And, Your Honor, for the record, again 
today, we are renewing our objection - well, I gues~ I should 
- I guess this is going to be relevant if we, depending on 
what the Court rules about a continuance but just to, just so 
it's out there, we are renewing our objection to the 
unavailability ruling because today is a different day, this 
is the 24th. I believe the Court's ruling yesterday was 
based in part on the fact that Mr. Estrada was presumably 
aware of yesterday's court date and not here. Today is a 
different day. I believe the State could have made overnight 
effort to locate him yesterday. They could have sent officers 
out to locate him. They could have called jails, hospitals, 
things of that nature. I think the unavailability of Mr. 






























objection in any event to that testimony coming in at all but 
again, that's an issue to be discussed if we are going 
forward today. But -
THE COURT: And the objection is still the 
unavailability, you're not arguing any of the other? 
MS. SINGLETON: I think my objection stands as it 
was yesterday along on -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. SINGLETON: - all grounds but I'm renewing the 
unavailable objections stating it is a different day but I do 
think that that's going to depend on whether we're going 
forward today or not but (inaudible). That's our position, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Tell me a little bit about defense 
witness that is the problem. Who is it and is the work 
situation such that - that was one of the things, wasn't it? 
That was the first request for a delay that certainly with 
the timing in the same respect that I would anticipate the 
State would be able to make some efforts to get their 
witnesses and that changes the unavailability and I even 
responded to that in one of the emails with the Court but 
what about this witness. I mean, she was subpoenaed for 
today and tomorrow. It's still anticipated that much of the 
testimony is going to be coming - excuse me, for yesterday 






























do need to make sure that we're clear on that, for the first 
two days of trial, of a 2-day scheduled trial, Wednesday and 
Thursday and then when we recognized yesterday that we were 
not going to have Wednesday as the first day, talked about 
putting on the evidence on Thursday and then hopefully being 
able to reserve Friday for arguments and deliberations but 
the defense did anticipate all along that it would be a 2-day 
trial and so you were anticipating the best you can with the 
presentation of evidence that the defense witnesses would be 
going on day two. Has she had an opportunity - and she is 
here so she can give me some information that way - to make 
arrangements and see if she could be available for Friday? 
First of all, just a proffer, I know that the defense doesn't 
have any obligation to put on a defense, defense witnesses, 
but what is anticipated that her -
MS. SINGLETON: As far as her testimony? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. SINGLETON: She was present during the -
THE COURT: Okay, so she -
MS. SINGLETON: - all of this -
THE COURT: - was anticipated all along. This is 
not rebuttal type of, to the extent that the defense is. 
Okay then, what is the work situation - and the name of the 
witness? 
MS. SINGLETON: This is Ms. Star. 
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THE COURT: Okay, and what is the work situation 
that you have? 
MS. STAR: I work Friday mornings and I don't know 
when I get off early in the morning. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. STAR: But that's about it. I get off early to 
walk to work because I don't have my boss to pick me up. 
THE COURT: Okay. And when do you typically get 
off? 
MS. STAR: Maybe about 7:30, sometimes 8:00. 
THE COURT: In the morning? 
MS. STAR: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that would be the case tomorrow 
morning as well? 
MS. STAR: That was -
THE COURT: So that would not be a conflict then .. 
There's no way that we're going to be starting before 7:30 in 
the morning. So am I correct in understanding then that the 
defense witness is the only concern about going forward 
today? And that you want to deal with that and we - with the 
next one as far as that you w~nt to have an opportunity to go 
through and redact testimony? 
MS. SINGLETON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Has that been done? I mean, we've had 






























on the record where we are and I'll let the State respond on 
that and it's going to be a back and forth response. My 
ruling yesterday - and the defense has accurately reflected 
that I ruled under the circumstances that the ·witness was 
unavailable yesterday and even with that ruling it does not 
change the responsibility of the proponent of that testimony 
to go forward with that testimony and we did run into some 
logistical problems with the presentation of that testimony. 
How does the State anticipate putting on the 
testimony that I ruled yesterday, the preliminary hearing 
testimony of Witness Delgado that I ruled was appropriate? 
MR. LEAVITT: The same way I think that we had left 
it yesterday and that is to play the actual audio. 
THE COURT: Okay. And again, it is the Court, the 
clerk that has been putting that together but with the two 
problems that had been raised with that testimony is the 
written testimony neither party was satisfied accurately 
represented it. There has not been an official transcript 
and has there been any effort to get some type of a redacted, 
written copy so that there aren't objections and that there 
aren't otherwise inadmissible portions of that testimony? 
The fact that I.ruled under the rule that he was unavailable 
does mean that otherwise inadmissible evidence wouldn't be 
able to come in through that way. Has there been any -






























gave the State our copy of the recording. 
THE COURT: And that's all we've been - really the 
State is the proponent of the testimony but the only written 
copy that we've had was the defendant's unofficial copy of 
it. 
MS. SINGLETON: That's correct, Your Honor, but my 
understanding was that the State wasn't satisfied with that 
so no, to answer your question, no, we have gone through to 
redact things and again, that was part of the basis for the 
continuance yesterday was that I thought upon further 
consideration that it would be more appropriate to get a 
certified transcript that is not, you know, one-sided, you 
know, our evidence that can be gone through. 
THE COURT: And with that you just used that as a 
basis for a motion to continue. But there has not been any 
attempt to come to an agreement of some kind of a copy 
redacted or otherwise that you have-
MR. LEAVITT: No. 
THE COURT: - on that one? 
All right. And the second reason and the most 
important reason why I put this all on the record this 
morning - and that's what we're doing is that when I received 
information that the email had been sent to the Court that 
the defense was looking for a continuance because of those 





























State. Was that inaccurate or is there an objection from the 
State to that continuance -
MR. LEAVITT: Yes, there is. 
THE COURT: - and that's why there needed to be a 
hearing with the defendant present and that's why there 
weren't - it wasn't handled on a phone call [inaudible], it 
just wasn't appropriate. If there's an objection to a motion 
to continue, then we need to address it. 
I am concerned about and in-custody defendant and 
now there is not the consideration of the witness that is a 
problem so the remaining basis for the request to continue 
this trial is because of the way we're going to be presenting 
the preliminary hearing testimony of Witness Delgado that I 
ruled was appropriate yesterday. 
And again, the availability goes to that. When 
there was a request for a continuance, certainly the State 
would need to continue to make efforts to have that witness 
available and that's one problem with granting a continuance 
as well is that then it starts all over again and the State 
needs to make the efforts to do it. 
I would also have anticipated that with the 
additional day that there would have been some efforts to 
find that witness this morning. Has anything been attempted 
to try and reach him? 




























yesterday, we already knew the trial was going to continue to 
today and we (inaudible) your ruling and we based our actions 
yesterday on that ruling. As far as his continued 
unavailability, nothing has changed. He received a 2-day 
subpoena. He was subpoenaed to be here today as well -
THE COURT: And he knew that he had both days. 
MR. LEAVITT: - and is not here. But what we did 
yesterday and we didn't address availability before we knew 
our trial yesterday was going to continue. We addressed it 
afterwards. Based on the Court's - based on those 
circumstances we thought the Court was making a ruling on 
what was going to happen today because we knew the trial 
wasn't going yesterday. 
THE COURT: Okay, and I agree except to the extent 
that the issue is how are we going to present it? What 
happened yesterday -
MR. LEAVITT: That's what - and I can respond to 
that. 
THE COURT: That's what we need to address. The 
State needs - the State in this case - because you're the 
proponent of the testimony to come in through the preliminary 
- is the one that then needs to have some way in which it can 
be presented. 
MR. LEAVITT: And I can address that now. I was 




























now I'll address as far as the presentation of the evidence, 
Your Honor. As far as the presentation of the evidence we 
discussed quite at length yesterday I think and the argument 
of defense yesterday was that the best evidence is that tape 
recording. My concern is you couldn't hear it very well. We 
went back to our office and made some efforts to make sure 
that we had some speakers here that maybe the audio was a 
little bit better. And, and we've come prepared and I think 
that Pat actually worked on it as well and we have a little 
bit better than the PA. So we did come prepared based on our 
conversation yesterday presented that way. 
As far as redaction, we haven't done anything to 
redact it. I do know from past experience redacting 
something that's from the court record recordings is kind of 
hard, there's proprietary things on there that make it a 
little bit difficult but the question on redaction though is 
it doesn't need to be because - and, you know, have we made 
efforts to redact it? No. But that I think is getting the 
cart a little bit before the horse. I don't think it needs 
to be redacted. There isn't anything in there. The 
testimony the defense referred to yesterday is on Page 6 of 
that transcript and it's during Ms. Singleton's cross 
examination of this witness and it's about when, the 
question, the context of this is he's asking - she's asking 





























bottom of Page 6, 184 is the question is like "a couple days, 
couple weeks, couple months?" And then he said "Ummrn, I 
don't, I stopped staying there until - I stopped staying 
there mostly (inaudible) and I when I found my bike ended up 
missing." I think that the motion yesterday was that this is 
inadmissible because it's some sort of character evidence and 
there's been no 404 - this isn't character evidence. This is 
in no way a pertinent trait of character of the defendant. 
There's not even an accusation in there that the defendant is 
the one who took the bike. It could have ended up missing 
several ways. This is a completely innocuous statement that 
certainly doesn't give rise to the need for a 404B hearing. 
This is a mayhem case. There's not even a theft involved in 
this case. 
Ummm, and so, and so our position is that, is that 
no, we haven't redacted it but it doesn't need to be 
redacted. This isn't something that is going to be so 
incredibly prejudicial that the jury is going to hear, Wow, 
Gabriel Estrada's bike was missing when he was over at that 
guy's house? He must have bit of Jacob Omar's ear. I don't 
see how a jury could ever, under any circumstances be 
affected in that way. This again, an innocuous statement 
saying that he just ended up not moving there, not living 
there 'cause his bike ended up missing. I don't think this 




























affect the jury or affect the defendant's right to a fair 
trial in any way. 
THE COURT: Defense's -
MS. SINGLETON: Your Honor, may I respond? 
THE COURT: - response. 
MS. SINGLETON: You know, taken in and of itself 
perhaps, you know - well, I still think that that, you know, 
the bike ended up missing is problematic but I think it's 
also in conjunction with Lines 175, 176 and 177 on Page 6 
when Mr. Estrada is referring to an incident prior to that 
and prior to this and going on and that's why I didn't stay 
there and inaudible and I think in conjunction, what this is 
suggesting is that there was some prior incident with, in 
between these two parties and there was something going on 
and I think that that is, I think the jury could maybe infer 
that something, you know, something else that was perhaps 
some form of 404B and again, this goes to, you know, the 
difference between cross examination at a preliminary hearing 
versus at a trial and what, you know, and what information is 
elicited, you know, because of the different motive of cross 
and I think those are our main objections, you know, to the 
testimony of Gabriel Estrada. 
But Your Honor, again and just so that the record 
is clear we are renewing our - I think it's proper for the 





























today even - because it·is germane - even though he may have 
been subpoenaed for a 2-day trial. I don't think that 
relieves the State of the burden to seek him out yesterday 
and I don't think that they made any effort to do so. And 
furthermore I don't think that the proffer yesterday, 
although we agreed to a proffer in terms of what they had 
done, I don't think that again, if that proffer is still, you 
know, the sole efforts that they made to obtain Mr. Estrada, 
I don't think that's sufficient. You know, the rules of 
service as outlines on the Court's website required that a 
person serving process, which I presume in this case would 
have been somebody from the D.A.'s office, that require that 
they should legibly document date and time of service, 
legibly print the person's name and address on the return of 
service, sign the return of service in substantial compliance 
with the rules and I don't think that emailing a pastor a 
subpoena and then just receiving some sort of verbal 
confirmation that that date was conveyed to a witness is 
sufficient to demonstrate service or knowledge of the date 
and especially now on day two when again there's been a whole 
other afternoon in which efforts could have been made to 
locate Mr. Estrada. So I think, we maintain our objection to 
any of this testimony coming in in the first place. I don't 
think the State has met their burden to show that Mr. Estrada 






























Court ruled yesterday but again today and so we maintain our 
objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. Does the State wish to respond? 
MR. LEAVITT: As far as the character nature of the 
parts Ms. Singleton just pointed out, from 174 on when he's 
talking about - let's look at what it says, not what we can, 
not what someone may infer from that. "But not a week, but I 
had an incident prior to that and prior to this, going on. 
That's why I didn't stay there." What does that mean? He 
could have gone to jail. He could have had an incident with 
someone else on the street. He could have had an incident 
where he slipped and fell at a McDonald's, nobody knows. 
This in no way - in no way creates an unfair inference that 
the defendant did something wrong, but again, if she's 
referring to 404B, 404B is an exception to the 404 rule 
against character evidence. 404 says the prohibited use is 
evidence of a person's character or trait of character not 
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in conformity with that character trait. Nothing in 
this gets us even close to creating some sort of a character 
inference that something happened with these guys and 
therefore on this date he was acting the same way that he did 
that day. It just doesn't fall within the scope of that 
rule. 





























addressed that. I actually think the way we did it was quite 
creative. We have a homeless person here and you know what, 
how do the cops find homeless people? Sometimes it's pretty 
hard to do and so we found someone who actually knew him, who 
had contact with him and he served him a subpoena for today. 
We didn't do anything else but I think it stands to reason 
that after we were, after we broke for the day yesterday and 
knew we were coming back today for this trial, we were 
hearing how that testimony is going to be heard and the Court 
made a ruling that in this trial, this witness is going to be 
unavailable. I can see how if we had addressed that 
yesterday and then continued it yesterday, we may need to do 
a little bit more work. But when we have a hearing after the 
jury is dismissed, knowing that we're going back in 23 hours, 
and the Court rules that this witness is unavailable for this 
trial and again, it's a 2-day subpoena, he's not here today. 
I don't think that there's anything else that we needed to do 
so and so we'd ask the Court to deny the continuance, we're 
ready to go forward today. 
THE COURT: And I am going to rule in favor of the 
State on these issues. My ruling was clear yesterday that 
under the - in terms of Rule 804 that an unavailable witness 
is unavailable if the proponent party has done reasonable 
means to try and get them there and it was clear that it was 































agree with the reasoning the State has presented on this as 
far as that issue goes because I specifically said we're 
going to have to be dealing with the continuance of the jury 
not being available on Wednesday. The jury was going to be 
called in on Thursday, and found under those circumstances 
that the witness was unavailable. 
The problems with yesterday was how we were going 
to put on that testimony and that's what all the discussion 
was. None of that was changed by the fact that we still 
couldn't have the jury on Wednesday and even the witness, the 
other homeless witness was here under the same means and 
received the same information and so it does not change my 
ruling because the 2-day trial did, in fact, go into the 
second date. So I'm still finding that he's still 
unavailable. 
As to the issue of whether or not the testimony 
going in by the recording is a basis for a continuance, again 
I am ruling that it is not. The information that is in the 
testimony of this witness that I'm allowing that there was 
some bad blood, something going on, simply does not rise to 
the level of 404B character evidence and so I am not going to 
preclude that. 
The argument yesterday and the status was that the 
defense and the prosecution had looked at the testimony, 
looked at the unofficial transcript, listened to the 
17 
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recordings and ultimately determined before we recessed when 
Mr. Goins was here and everyone was present, that the 
recording was the best evidence, not necessarily the easiest 
way to put it on but the best evidence and that, in fact, was 
the argument that the defense made and both the Court and the 
parties have made efforts now to put that in through the 
recording and we will follow that process. 
Given the two issues then that the defense witness 
is available for today and tomorrow and is here and present, 
because it won't be until after work and the fact that the 
preliminary hearing testimony that I've admitted is coming in 
through the recording, there doesn't really seem to be any 
reason to continue an in-custody case where the jury is now 
here and present to hear it rather than continue it to 
another date where he would fall back into second or third 
position. He was number two even in this one. 
Thank you. All right. 
MS. SINGLETON: Your Honor, may I just, I 
understand the Court has ruled and I'm not challenging that 
ruling necessarily I just want to, I mean - I just want to 
make one other objection for the record just for purposes of 
appeal. 
THE COURT: You have the benefit of the record. 
That's absolutely appropriate. 






























Page 6 of the preliminary hearing testimony at Line 163 when 
Mr. Estrada is basically saying I have (inaudible), I needed 
a place to sleep (inaudible) Star and I. I thought I was 
going to be safe, I thought everything was okay." I think 
that is objection - I mean, we would object to that as -
THE COURT: I'm to Page 6. Tell me the lines 
again. 
MS. SINGLETON: 163 and 164. "I thought I was 
going to be safe, I thought everything was okay." I mean, I 
thinks that's another reference to some sort of prior, I mean 
- well, I guess it's 404 but I just would object to that. 
THE COURT: Anything response to the defendant's 
objections to Line 163, 164 and 165? 
of it -
MR. LEAVITT: No, Your Honor, I feel the same way -
THE COURT: The argument -
MR. LEAVITT: - you can create inferences from any 
THE COURT: - is the same. Okay. All right. 
MR. LEAVITT: - that's the same. 
THE COURT: And the record has been made clear and 
I am overruling the objection on that. Thank you. Do you 
want the benefit of the record for anything else because this 
is the time to put that on even given my rulings. That's not 
improper at all. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - AUGUST 22, 2013 
JUDGE PAUL G. MAUGHAN PRESIDING 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, is this Goins? 
MS. SINGLETON: Yes, Your Honor. 
DEFENDANT GOINS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Goins? How many witnesses will the 
State have? 
MR. LEAVITT: I anticipate we'll probably call two 
witnesses. We have three witnesses subpoenaed, but I think 
we'll be fine to go two. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you waive a formal 
reading of Information? 
MS. SINGLETON: I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to call your 
first witness? 
MR. LEAVITT: Yes, Your Honor. Our first witness is 
Gabriel Estrada. He's in the hallway. I'll go grab him. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. LEAVITT: And, Your Honor, before Mr. Estrada 
gets here, Officer Mortensen's now entering the courtroom. I 
don't know if the exclusionary rule's been invoked, but if it 






























MS. SINGLETON: Ok~y. I would invoke it for the 
record, but that's fine. 
THE COURT: Okay. Officer may remain. 
GABRIEL ESTRADA 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Come and sit in this chair, sir. 
Would you state your appearances, please, for the 
record? Sorry. 
MS. SINGLETON: Lacey Singleton for Mr. Goins. 
MR. LEAVITT: Peter Leavitt for the State. 
THE COURT: All right, you may proceed. 
MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LEAVITT: 
Q Could you state your name and spell your last name 
for the record? 
A 
Q 
Gabriel, the last name is Estrada, E-S-T-R-A-D-A. 
Mr. Estrada, do you know an individual by the name 
of Desean Goins? 
A Yes. 
Q How do you know Desean Goins? 
A It was a mutual thing, a mutual friendship. 
Q How long have you known him? 





























Q A month or two? And do you see Desean Goins in the 
courtroom today? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Could you point him out and describe where he's 
sitting and what he's wearing? 






Okay. Is he sitting at a table? 
Yes, sir. 
All right, is he sitting next to a woman? 
Yes, sir. 
MS. SINGLETON: Objection, this is leading. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
He's 
MR. LEAVITT: Will the record reflect identification 
of the defendant? 
THE COURT: It will. 
Q (BY MR. LEAVITT) All right. Did something happen 
with Mr. Goins back in July that would've brought you to 
court today? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Let's talk about it. Do you remember 
the exact date that that happened? 
A I do not. 
Q 
A 
Okay, was it - but it was in July? 


































Okay, and is that Pioneer Park here in Salt Lake? 
Yes, it is. 
All right. Tell us what happened? 
Well, what happened is -
And, I'm sorry, let me just ask you to just - to 
pull the mica little closer and just speak up a little bit. 
The room's kind of big. We just want to make sure we get 
your voice, okay? 
A Okay. What happened that day is, supposedly he 
came up to me at the block, which is 210 Rio Grande, and at 
the homeless shelter he came up to me with Star saying -
Q Who - sorry, let me stop you, who's Star? 
A The young lady in the back. 
Q Okay. And how do you know Star? 
A Through Myra. 
Q Okay. 
A We - I knew her before I knew him. 
THE COURT: Mr. Leavitt, is she liable to be a 
witness in (inaudible)? 
MR. LEAVITT: I think she is - I didn't know who she 
was, so, yes. 
MS. SINGLETON: I didn't either. Your - okay. And 
so at that point, I - I'm going to have to have you step out 
of the courtroom. 






























MR. LEAVITT: She is a very likely witness in the 
THE COURT: All right. You may continue. 
MR. LEAVITT: Thank you, Judge. 
Q (BY MR. LEAVITT) So, you said your - I think you 
said you were at the shelter? 
Yes. 
And -




Q So the defendant and Star, and once they approached 
you, what happened? 
A He came at me basically in a disrespectful tone 
saying I stole his• phone, he said, I do a killer (inaudible), 
mother F-er, pulled out a knife, waived it around basically 
saying I stole his phone, or saying that I need to get his 
phone back to him. And (inaudible) very possible as long as 
he would have that (inaudible). 
Q Now, all right. So you said that he then pulled 
out a knife. How was he holding the knife when he pulled it 
out? 
A Like anybody else would hold a knife when you're 




So, it was in his hand? 
In his hand. 
Okay, so I just want to get an idea of how exactly 
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he was holding it. Was he holding it up high? Was he 
holding it down low? Just give us a little more description. 




That's how he was holding it. 
And when he was holding it, was he facing you, or 
was he standing away from you? 
A He was facing me. 
Q About how far away from you was he standing when he 





Like two feet away. 
I'm sorry? 
Within arm's reach, basically. 
Okay. And you said - a moment ago you said he was 
waving it around. Could you give us a little bit more 
description of how he was waving it around? 
A I would say, he had the knife like this, he was 
pretty much - like that. 
Q Okay, so if - so just so that - would it be a fair 
statement to say that he was moving it back and forth in 
front of his body? 






































That's a yes. 
All right. 
Yes. 
Q Okay. And did he - when he - he pulled the knife 
out, did he pull the knife out before or after he had said 
the statement about killing any mother F-er who took his 
phone? 
A Before, and it was in his hand. That's - after 
(inaudible) saying that I need to get his phone back, then he 
pulled out a knife. 
Q Okay. 
A And that's when he started saying about stabbing 
someone, killing someone. 
Q All right. After he said that, what happened next? 
A I told him I didn't have anything to do with that. 
I told him what happened. I told him I woke up, I got my 
clothes ready, I got ready, and I left. His home boy, or his 
friend, was awake before I was. 
Okay. So, what - how did the confrontation end? Q 
A I told him, I don't have it, told him I didn't have 
to do anything with it, it's not my problem, it's his. And I 
walked away. 
Q When you walked away, did you see what the 
defendant did? 





























didn't want to be in it. 
Q So, did you have any more encounters with the 
defendant that day? 
A 
Q 
When he got arrested. 
Okay. And about how long after the confrontation 
you had with him at the shelter was it until you saw when he 
was getting arrested? 
A Half-hour. 
Q Okay. 
A It would have been 30 minutes from me walking 
around the block and finding out that Myra is leaving, and 
finding out that she is (inaudible) blood from right here, 
and -
Q Is Myra known by another name? 
A Jacob Omar. 
Q Okay. And at the beginning of this, I asked you if 
the Pioneer Park was in Salt Lake County. The shelter you 
(inaudible) where this incident occurred, is that in Salt 
Lake County as well? 
A Yes. 
MR. LEAVITT: Okay. Thank you. I have no further 
questions for this witness. 
Ill 
Ill 































BY MS. SINGLETON: 
Q So, Mr. Estrada, you were staying at the shelter 











With Mr. - with Mr. Goins? 
Not with him. 
Not with him? 
Huh-uh (negative). 
But you knew him from there; is that correct? 
No. 
You - you knew him from somewhere else? 
I had met him is when I needed a place to sleep is 
with Star. And I thought I was going to be safe, I thought 
everything was okay with him. 






Okay. And that's how you met Desean? 
Him. Yes. 
Okay. And so you did stay, then, with Sean - or 






A week or so? 
And -
How long was that? 
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A Well, not a week, it was a few - that I had an 
incident prior to that, prior to this that's going on now, 
and that's why I didn't stay there any more. I didn't 
(inaudible)-
Q Okay, but - so how long did you stay with Star and 
Desean? About a week? 
A I would say within months, but ranging going back 
and forth and staying there a few nights {inaudible). 
Q Okay. So - but when was the last time that you -
do you recall when the last time you stayed with them was 
prior to this incident on this day? 
A 
Q 
I don't recall. 
Like a couple days, couple weeks, couple months? 
A I stopped staying there until - I stopped staying 
there - well, sleeping there at night is when I found out my 
bike end up missing. 
Q Okay. So, you - on this day, you were at the 




Not in the shelter. 
Outside of it? 
Outside of it. 
A He was walking from his apartment that's in Rose 
Park off of 800 all the way down. I don't know the exact 
address. It was close to the tracks, is when he approached 






























men's side of the shelter. 
Q Okay. So this encounter with him occurred sort of 
on the men's side of the shelter? 
Yeah. A. 
Q Okay, right outside of it? Okay. What - was there 
anybody else around at that point? 




A There was people probably around observing, but not 
in it. 
Q Okay. You said earlier that you told Desean that 
you had - that by the time you woke up that morning, his home 





Now, who is that? 
(Inaudible), but I don't recall his last name. 
Q Okay, what - so, what was the relevance of that -
what was the point of that, that - were you staying next to 
him, sleeping next - I mean, sleeping near him or something? 
A No, it is - I went there because I was tired and I 
wanted to sleep somewhere besides outside. So I went there 
and fell asleep there, because I had to get my clothes ready. 
I wanted my clothes ironed. And he was there before I got 
there that night - or the night before. Then when I wake up, 
he was awake. 
11 
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Q Okay. And so - so when he approached you - and you 







What do you mean by that? 
Vulgar. 
Vulgar? 
High tone, attitude. 
Q Okay. And he thought you had his phone, correct? 
A Yeah, he thought I stole his phone and sold it. 
Q Okay. When - do you recall when the last time - so 
before - so before this day, when was the last time you saw 
Desean prior to this? Had he been -




That night. @ 
The night before? With his friend who was staying 
in the shelter? 
A Mrnm, his friend wasn't in the shelter. He was 
there at his apartment that night. 
You were at Desean's apartment that night? Q 
A I didn't stay there, but I don't like staying there 
that much. 
Q Okay, but you were there the night before. Okay. 
That's a yes? 






























THE WITNESS: Yes, because I had to get my clothes 
ready, like I said. 








MS. SINGLETON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. LEAVITT: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Estrada. You may 
step down. 
MR. LEAVITT: Our next witness is Jacob Omar, he's 
in the hall. I'll go grab him. 
THE COURT: If you'd come up and be sworn, please. 
JACOB OMAR 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Come and sit in this chair, please. 
MR. LEAVITT: May I proceed? 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LEAVITT: 
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the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. 
Even without the state provision guaranteeing this right, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state 
prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment. Shepardize - Narrow by this 
Headnote 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v > 
Right to Confrontation v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Defendant's Rights ... > General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v- > Defendant's Rights v > ~ 
Right to Confrontation v 
HN3~ The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v > 
Right to Confrontation v 
HN4~ See Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
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Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v > 
Right to Confrontation v 
HNSA. Although the federal Confrontation Clause does not include specific language 
requiring face to face confrontation, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that simply as a 
matter of English it confers at least a right to meet face to face all those who appear and 
give evidence at trial. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v > 
Right to Confrontation v 
HN6& The purposes behind both the federal and state Confrontation Clauses are well 
articulated. The Confrontation Clause is designed to ensure that convictions are not 
obtained through the use of ex parte affidavits. Testimony is much more reliable when it 
is given under oath at trial where the witness can be cross-examined and the jury may 
observe the witness's demeanor. Thus, although by necessity exceptions to the right of 
confrontation must exist, courts have continually maintained the importance of that 
right. Accordingly, courts must protect the most obvious manifestation of that right-the 
opportunity for cross-examination. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v > 
Right to Confrontation v 
HN7~ The right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him has been regarded 
as a fundamental right for hundreds of years. It was included in both the United States 
and Colorado Constitutions to insure that persons would not be convicted on the basis of 
ex parte testimony and without the benefit of cross-examination. This right remains 
crucial to the adversarial system of law. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process..,.. > 
Right to Confrontation v 
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights v > State Application v 
HNB~ The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to state 
prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment and Colorado courts have followed 
U.S. Supreme Court law regarding the Confrontation Clause. Shepardize - Narrow by 
this Headnote 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v > 
Right to Confrontation v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > ~ 
Evidence v 





HN91:. The Confrontation Clause provides a procedural, not a substantive, guarantee. It 
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Therefore, the flaw in the 
Roberts test is that it allows judges to substitute their determinations of amorphous 
notions of reliability for a jury's determination. Admitting statements deemed reliable by 
a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. The Confrontation 
Clause applies to "witnesses" or those who 11 bear testimony. 11 "Testimonial" is not defined 
comprehensively, but it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights,,. > Criminal Process v > 
Right to Confrontation ... 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > 
General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > ~ 
Evidence v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Examination of Witnesses v > ~ 
Cross-Examination v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > General Overview.,.,. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses,,. > ~ Unavailability v 
Evidence > Types of Evidence v > Testimony v > General Overview,,. 
Evidence > ... > Examination v > Cross-Examinations v > General Overview v 
HNlO~ The Supreme Court has refocused its analysis of Confrontation Clause 
violations, mandating not that evidence necessarily be reliable, but that its reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner--through cross-examination. The Crawford test 
therefore limits the admissibility of testimonial evidence, which includes preliminary 
hearing testimony, to that of unavailable witnesses whom the accused has had an 
adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Confrontation Clause inquiry is 
changed to whether a defendant had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine, 
not whether the previous testimony is reliable. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights ... > Criminal Process ... > 
Right to Confrontation v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > 
General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > 
Entitlement v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings ... > Preliminary Hearings v > ~ 




Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > 
Procedural Matters v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Defendant's Rights v > ~ 
Right to Confrontation..., 
Evidence > ... > Examination v > Cross-Examinations ... > General Overview v 
HN11~ A preliminary hearing is limited to matters necessary to a determination of 
probable cause. The rights of the defendant are therefore curtailed: evidentiary and 
procedural rules are relaxed, and the rights to cross-examine witnesses and to introduce 
evidence are limited to the question of probable cause. A defendant has no constitutional 
right to unrestricted confrontation of witnesses and to introduce evidence at a 
preliminary hearing. By rule, defendants have the right to a preliminary hearing under 
certain circumstances, and pursuant to the rule a defendant may cross-examine 
witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf, Colo. R. Crim. P. 
7(h)(3). However, the preliminary hearing is not intended to be a mini-trial or to afford 
the defendant an opportunity to effect discovery. Hence, a preliminary hearing does not 
provide the same safeguards as a trial. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers v > Judges v > General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings ... > 
General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > ~ 
Evidence v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > 
Procedural Matters v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Defendant's Rights v > ~ 
Right to Confrontation ..., 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > Credibility v 
Evidence > Types of Evidence v > Testimony v > General Overview v 
Evidence> ... > Examination v > Cross-Examinations v > General Overview v 
HN12A- The judge's findings at a preliminary hearing are restricted to a determination 
of probable cause. A judge may not engage in credibility determinations unless the 
testimony is incredible as a matter of law. Aside from the exceptionally rare instance of 
credibility as an issue of law, defense counsel has no legitimate motive to engage in 
credibility inquiries and may be prohibited from doing so. Thus, the right to cross-
examination may be curtailed by the judge in all but the most unusual circumstances. 
Because credibility is not at issue and probable cause is a low standard, once a prima 
facie case for probable cause is established, there is little defense counsel can do to 
show that probable cause does not exist. Therefore, as a practical matter, defense 
counsel may decline to cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing, 
understanding that the cross-examination would have no bearing on the issue of 
probable cause and that the judge may limit or prohibit the cross-examination. Thus the 
opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is very limited. Further, the 
opportunity for cross-examination regarding the credibility of a witness, as a matter of 




fact, exists only to the extent that an attorney persists in asking questions that have no 
bearing on the issues before the court, and such irrelevant questioning is not prohibited 
by the court. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > 
General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > ~ 
Evidencev 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Defendant's Rights v > ~ 
Rig ht to Confrontation v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Examination of Witnesses v > ~ 
Cross-Examination,.. 
HN13A. The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the 
opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the 
witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the 
merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of 
determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. Shepardize -
Narrow by this Headnote 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings,.. > General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings,.. > Preliminary Hearings v > 
General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > (§1 
Evidence,.. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v- > 
Procedural Matters T 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v- > Defendant's Rights,,. > [§ 
Right to Confrontation v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v- > Examination of Witnesses v > ~ 
Cross-Examination v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > ~ Unavailability v 
Evidence > Types of Evidence v > Testimony v > General Overview v 
Evidence > ... > Examination v > Cross-Examinations v > General Overview v 
Evidence > ... > Examination v > Cross-Examinations,.. > Scope v 
HN1.4:I;. The preliminary hearing does not satisfy Confrontation Clause requirements. A 
preliminary hearing does not provide an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. It 
prevents the preliminary hearing from becoming a mini-trial which would expend time 
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and resources the judiciary does not possess. Changing the purpose of these hearings 
would impact all criminal cases, not just those with Confrontation Clause issues. 
Preliminary hearings are limited to a determination of probable cause so that they do not 
become mini-trials. Were the courts to allow extensive cross-examination by defense 
counsel so as to prevent any Confrontation Clause viola~ions at trial if a witness were to 
become unavailable, it would turn the preliminary hearing in every case into a much 
longer and more burdensome process for all parties involved. Therefore, the supreme 
court does not expand the scope of preliminary hearings in order to allow them to satisfy 
Confrontation Clause requirements. Rather, it merely reiterates a prior holding; although 
a defendant must have been provided with a prior adequate opportunity to cross-
examine an unavailable witness before the State can admit that witness's previous 
testimony into evidence, the preliminary hearing does not provide an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause 
requirements. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Examination of Witnesses v > ~ 
Cross-Examination v 
HN15A Cross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery 
of truth. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v > 
Right to Confrontation v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Burdens of Proof v > General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Burdens of Proof v > Prosecution v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review v > Harmless & Invited Error v > 
General Overview v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review v > Harmless & Invited Error v > 
Constitutional Rights v 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review v > Harmless & Invited Error v > 
Evidence? 
Evidence > Burdens of Proof y > Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt v 
HN16ia Two types of constitutional error exist: structural errors, which affect the 
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial 
process itself; and trial errors, which occur during the presentation of the case to the 
jury and may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented. Structural errors require automatic reversal. Trial errors require reversal 
unless an appellate court determines that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless. 
Confrontation Clause violations are trial errors. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials..., > Examination of Witnesses v > ~ 





Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > ~ Presentation...,. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review v > Harmless & Invited Error v > 
General Overview v 
Evidence > Admissibility v > Procedural Matters v > Rulings on Evidence v 
HN17~ The inquiry in a harmless error analysis is whether the guilty verdict actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error, and not whether, in a trial 
that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered. 
Factors a reviewing court should consider include, the importance of the witness' 
testimony to the prosecution 1s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 
presence or absence of corroborating or contradictory evidence on the material points of 
the witness' testimony, the extent of the cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the 
overall strength of the prosecution's case. Thus, a reviewing court must look at the trial 
as a whole and decide whether there is a reasonable probability that the defendant could 
have been prejudiced by the error. If so, the error is not harmless and the reviewing 
court must reverse the conviction below. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
• Headnotes/Syllabus 
Head notes 
Confrontation Clause - Preliminary Hearing - Unavailable Witness 
Syllabus 
In this case involving a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, the supreme 
court considers the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354, No. 02-9410, 2004 WL 413301 (U.S. Mar. 8, 
2004). In line with that decision, the supreme court holds that before a witness 1s previous 
testimony can be used at trial, the witness must be unavailable to testify at trial and the 
defendant must have had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine that witness. The 
supreme court reiterates its holding in People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 120, 597 P.2d 204 (1979) 
that because of the limited scope of the preliminary hearing in Colorado, that hearing does 
not provide an adequate opportunity for cross-examination sufficient to meet Confrontation 
Clause requirements. 
Thus, in this case, the supreme court holds that an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing 
testimony was improperly admitted at trial. As the court finds that the error was not 
harmless, the case is remanded for a new trial. 
Counsel: Ken Salazar, Attorney [**2] General Paul Koehler, Assistant Attorney General 
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Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Petitioner. 
David S. Kaplan v, Colorado State Public Defender Alan Kratz v, Deputy State Public Defender 
Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Respondent. 
Judges: JUSTICE MARTINEZ v delivered the Opinion of the Court. JUSTICE COATS v dissents, 
and JUSTICE KOURLIS v joins in the dissent. 
Opinion by: MARTINEZ v 
Opinion 
[ *972] EN BANC 
JUSTICE MARTINEZ v delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
JUSTICE COATS v dissents, and JUSTICE KOURLIS v joins in the dissent. 
I. Introduction 
In this case, we consider whether the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness 
is admissible at trial. In accordance with the United States Supreme Court1s recent decision in 
Crawford v. Washinqton,541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354, No. 02-9410, 2004 
WL 413301 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2004), we hold that HNlY previous testimony is admissible only if 
the witness is unavailable and the defendant had an adequate prior opportunity for cross-
examination. Because preliminary hearings in Colorado do not present an adequate 
opportunity for cross-examination, we find that the trial court erred in admitting preliminary 
hearing testimony. The error in this case was not harmless. Therefore, [**3] we affirm the 
court of appeals' decision remanding the case for a new trial. 
II. Facts and Procedure 
The victim in this case, Darla Fischer, died as a result of complications related to a cerebral 
hemorrhage that was caused by an impact to the head. At trial, the parties disputed whether 
a fall or an assault caused the [*973] injury. A jury convicted Respondent Richard Fry, 
Fischer's boyfriend at the time, of second degree assault and second degree murder for 
Fischer•s death. 
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution called FrY-s uncle, Ario Gene Burgess, to testify. 
Burgess testified that about two days after Fischer was hospitalized, Fry telephoned him and 
stated that "Darla [Fischer] was in the hospital and that he had put her there." Burgess 
further stated that Fry had told him he had hit Fischer and that he thought she had brain 
damage. However, Fry telephoned him again about two weeks later, Burgess testified, and 
told him that he had "no hand in it, that somebody else had done that. 11 
Defense counsel did not cross-examine Burgess at the preliminary hearing. Burgess died 
before trial. 
After Burgess died, Fry1s counsel filed a Motion to Exclude Hearsay Testimony [**4] of Ario 





Gene Burgess. Fry argued that Burgess's preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at 
trial pursuant to the Confrontation Clause in article II, section 16, of the Colorado 
Constitution, and this court's decision in People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 120, 597 P.2d 204 (1979). 
Moreover, the defense contended that Burgess had a motive to lie because he had allegedly 
been assaulted by Fry and because he had been intimately involved with Fry's girlfriend, 
Fischer. The prosecution countered that the testimony was admissible under the residual 
hearsay exception because the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine Burgess at the 
preliminary hearing. Additionally, the prosecution asserted that the testimony was reliable 
because Burgess had no motive to lie. 
The trial court denied the motion, ruling that Burgess's testimony was admissible under the 
residual hearsay exception, C.R.E. 807. The trial court reasoned that although People v. Smith 
prohibits the use of preliminary hearing testimony under C.R.E. 804, such testimony can be 
admitted pursuant to another hearsay exception which meets the two part test of 
unavailability and reliability as set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L Ed. 2d 597, 100 
S. Ct. 2531 (1980), [**5] and People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1983). The case then 
went to trial and Fry was convicted. 
The court of appeals reversed. People v. Fry, 74 P.3d 360 (Colo. App. 2002). It stated that 
Smith established a bright-line rule prohibiting the use of preliminary hearing testimony of an 
unavailable witness. Id. at 364. Further, the court of appeals reasoned that although Smith 
was decided before Roberts and Dement, it "essentially determined that preliminary hearing 
testimony does not possess the requisite trustworthiness" to satisfy the reliability prong of the 
Roberts test. Id. Thus, the court of appeals found that the testimony was improperly 
admitted. Id. Additionally, the court of appeals held that the error was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. at 365. The court noted that the prosecution relied heavily on Burgess's 
testimony and that the other incriminating evidence was ambiguous and insufficient to 
support the conviction. Id. The court of appeals therefore remanded the case for a new trial. 
Id. 
We granted certiorari to review two questions: first, whether Smith [**6] should be read to 
categorically exclude all preliminary hearing testimony, even when that testimony meets the 
two-part test of unavailability and reliability and would be admissible under a hearsay 
exception other than C.R.E. 804, the exception discussed in Smith; and second, whether any 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. !_1.!.! 
[**7] [*974] In the time between briefing and oral argument in this case, however, the 
United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington. which overruled Roberts. 
Crawford v. Washington, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, No. 02-9410, 2004 WL 413301 (U.S. Mar. 8, 
2004). The Court held that testimonial statements of an unavailable witness are not 
admissible unless the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Consequently, 
we now review the questions before us in light of Crawford. 
III. Confrontation Clause 
To answer the questions before us, we first briefly review the purposes and history behind the 
Confrontation Clause. Next, we examine the progression of United States Supreme Court 
cases analyzing the Confrontation Clause and our own interpretation and application of those 
cases. We then outline the nature and purpose of preliminary hearings in Colorado and how 
they impact our Confrontation Clause analysis. We then apply this analysis to the case before 
us and find that the use of a transcript from the preliminary hearing as evidence at trial 
violated Fry's right to confront the witnesses against him. Finally, we review the court of 
appeals' decision to determine [**8] whether the error in this case was harmless. We agree 
with the court of appeals' decision that the prosecution did not show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error was harmless. Thus, we affirm the court of appeals decision remanding 
the case for a new trial. 
A. Confrontation Clause-Purposes and History 
HN2-;; A defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is guaranteed by both the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article II, section 16 of the Colorado 
Constitution. 12.!._j Even without our state provision guaranteeing this right, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that 11this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and 
state prosecutions" through the Fourteenth Amendment. Crawford v. Washington, 158 L. Ed. 
2d 177, 2004 WL 413301 at *5 (citing Pointer v. Texas. 380 U.S. 400, 406, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 
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85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965)). 
[**9] The history behind the Confrontation Clause is discussed extensively in Crawford, 158 
L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL 413301 at *5-*9. Although we do not discuss it at length here, we 
review the Clause 1s history briefly to illustrate the importance of the right to confrontation in 
our system of law. 
The concept that an accused has the right to confront the witnesses against him dates back to 
Roman times, but was incorporated into English law in the 1600s. Crawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d 
177, 2004 WL 413301 at *5-*6. English courts developed the right, allowing out-of-court 
testimony only if the witness was unable to testify in person. 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, [WL] at *6. 
English courts further developed the common law to require that statements made before trial 
were admissible only if the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. 
Although several state constitutions included a right of confrontation, the United States 
Constitution did not originally include that right. 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, IYYJJ at *8. Following 
criticism regarding the omission, the First Congress included the right in the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. The People of Colorado included a right to confrontation of witnesses against 
an accused in Colorado's [**10] original constitution and it has remained unchanged since 
that time. See Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. 
HN6~ [*975] The purposes behind both the federal and state Confrontation Clauses are 
well articulated. We have stated that the Confrontation Clause is designed to ensure that 
convictions are not obtained through the use of ex parte affidavits. People v. Bastardo, 191 
Colo. 521, 524, 554 P.2d 297, 300 (1976); see also Crawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL 
413301 at *9. We have recognized that testimony is much more reliable when it is given 
under oath at trial where the witness can be cross-examined and the jury may observe the 
witness's demeanor. People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675, 680 (Colo. 1983). Thus, although by 
necessity exceptions to the right of confrontation must exist, we have continually maintained 
the importance of that right. Accordingly, we must protect the most obvious manifestation of 
that right-the opportunity for cross-examination. See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406-07. 
In sum, HN'R the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him has been 
regarded as a fundamental right for hundreds of years. It was included in both the [**11] 
United States and Colorado Constitutions to insure that persons would not be convicted on 
the basis of ex parte testimony and without the benefit of cross-examination. This right 
remains crucial to our adversarial system of law. 
B. Confrontation Clause Case Law 
We first examine the history of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of the Confrontation 
Clause. HNB':I The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to state 
prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment and we have followed U.S. Supreme Court 
law regarding the Confrontation Clause. In addition, we outline our case law and our 
interpretation of the Supreme Court's case law. 
Until the Supreme Court1s recent decision in Crawford, the test for Confrontation Clause 
violations was outlined in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 
(1980), overruled by ~rawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL 413301. In Roberts, the Court 
set forth a two-part test to determine whether prior testimony of a hearsay declarant was 
admissible. Id. at 65-66. First, the Court stated that the Confrontation Clause required that 
the declarant be unavailable to testify at trial. Id. at 65. Second, if [**12] unavailability was 
established, the Court found that the Clause approves only statements that bear adequate 
indicia of reliability. Id. at 65-66. The Court held that reliability could be inferred where the 
testimony fell under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 66. Before evidence could be 
admitted when it did not come under such an exception, the party offering the evidence had 
to show that the evidence possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. 
Applying this test in Roberts, the Court found that the Confrontation Clause was not violated 
by the introduction of an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing testimony where the 
witness had been cross-examined at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 73. The Court held that 
"since there was an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the witness], and counsel ... 
availed himself of that opportunity, the transcript ... bore sufficient 'indicia of reliability' and 
afforded 1the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. 111 
Id. (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216, 33 L. Ed. 2d 293, 92 S. Ct. 2308 (1972)). 




We adopted the Roberts test in [**13] Dement, 661 P.2d at 681. In Dement, we reached 
only the first prong because we found that the prosecution failed to establish unavailability. 
Id. at 681. However, in later cases, we applied the reliability prong of the Roberts test. We 
stated that we must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement to 
decide whether it possessed the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness. Stevens v. People, 
29 P.3d 305, 314 (2001), abrogated by Crawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL 413301, (citing 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990)). Although 
we noted that courts have "considerable discretion in determining what factors may enhance 
or detract from the statement's reliability," we pointed out several factors a court could use. 
People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 406-07 (2001), abrogated by Crawford,158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 
2004 WL 413301, [*976] (citing Weight, 497 U.S. at 822). These factors included whether 
the statement was detailed, how soon after the events the statement was made, whether the 
statement was voluntary, whether the declarant had a motive to (**14] inculpate the 
defendant, among others. Id. at 406-07; see also Stevens. 29 P.3d at 314. Thus, our 
reliability analyses considered both the procedural setting in which the contested statements 
were made as well as the substance of the statements. See id. 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford rejects the reliability prong of the Roberts 
test in favor of an inquiry into whether the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses. Crawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL 413301 at *19. In explaining its 
abrogation of the Roberts test, the Court in Crawford begins with the purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause. 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, (WL] at *9. The Court explains that the "the 
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of 
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the 
accused." ML. The Court notes that the common law at the time of the Sixth Amendment's 
enactment 11conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and 
a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those 
limitations." 158 L. Ed. 2d 177,[WL] [**15] at *11. 
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision explains that HN9T the Clause provides a procedural, 
not a substantive, guarantee. 158 L. Ed. 2d 177,[WL] at *14. "It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination. 11 Id. Therefore, the flaw in the Roberts test is that it allows 
judges to substitute their determinations of "amorphous notions of 'reliability"' for a jury's 
determination. ML. The Supreme Court cites inconsistent decisions of reliability as a reason 
why allowing courts to make reliability determinations about ex parte testimony does not 
provide the protection envisioned by the Framers adopting the Confrontation Clause. 159 L. 
Ed. 2d 177, LWJJ. at *15 (citing Stevens, 29 P.3d at 316, and Farrell, 34 P.3d at 406-07, as 
examples of the inconsistent application of the Roberts test due to the wide range of 
sometimes contradictory factors used in the reliability analysis). 11Admitting statements 
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation." 158 L. 
Ed. 2d 177, [WL] at *14. 
Crawford limits its holding to "testimonial statements," noting that the [**16] Confrontation 
Clause applies to 11witnesses 11 or those who "bear testimony. 11 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, [WL] at *10. 
Crawford explicitly declines to define "testimonial 11 comprehensively, but notes that "it applies 
at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing." 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, Lw..Ll at *10. 
HN10~ The Supreme Court has refocused its analysis of Confrontation Clause violations, 
mandating not that evidence necessarily be reliable, but that its reliability be assessed in a 
particular manner--through cross-examination. The Crawford test therefore limits the 
admissibility of testimonial evidence, which includes preliminary hearing testimony, to that of 
unavailable witnesses whom the accused has had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-
examine. In light of Crawford, we reject the Roberts reliability analysis that we adopted in 
Dement. Consequently, to the extent that Stevens and Fa.rrell and any of our other prior cases 
employ that analysis, we overrule those cases. We therefore change our Confrontation Clause 
inquiry to whether a defendant had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine, not 
whether the previous testimony is reliable. 
C. Preliminary Hearings in Colorado 
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Before the [**17] holdings of either Roberts or Crawford. we noted that the admissibility of 
prior testimony depended on the nature of the proceeding at which the prior testimony was 
made. People v. Smith. 198 Colo. 120, 125, 597 P.2d 204, 207 (1979), overruled on other 
grounds by People v. Vance, 933 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1997), overruled by Griego v. People, 19 
P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001) (Vance overruled Smith on grounds that materiality is an issue that must 
be submitted to the jury; Griego later overruled Vance on the proper standard of review for 
such an error). In particular, we examined whether prior testimony given at a preliminary 
hearing provided an adequate [*977] opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 125-26, 597 
P.2d at 207-08. In deciding that question, we looked to the purpose of the preliminary 
hearing. Id. We concluded that due to the limited nature of the preliminary hearing, the 
opportunity for cross-examination was insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id ... at 
126, 597 P.2d at 208. We now reiterate that holding. 
HN11~ A preliminary hearing is limited to matters necessary to a determination of probable 
cause. [**18] kl at 125, 597 P.2d at 207. The rights of the defendant are therefore 
curtailed: evidentiary and procedural rules are relaxed, and the rights to cross-examine 
witnesses and to introduce evidence are limited to the question of probable cause. Id. 
A defendant has no constitutional right to unrestricted confrontation of witnesses 
and to introduce evidence at a preliminary hearing. By rule, defendants have the 
right to a preliminary hearing under certain circumstances, and pursuant to the 
rule a defendant 'may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce 
evidence in his own behalf.' Crim. P. 7(h)(3). However, the preliminary hearing is 
not intended to be a mini-trial or to afford the defendant an opportunity to effect 
discovery. 
Id. at 125-26, 597 P.2d at 207-08 (quoting Rex v. Sullivan, 194 Colo. 568, 571, 575 P.2d 408, 
410 (1978)). Hence, a preliminary hearing does not provide the same safeguards as a trial. 
Additionally, HN12¥ the judge's findings at a preliminary hearing are restricted to a 
determination of probable cause. gL_ at 125, 597 P.2d at 207. A judge may not engage in 
credibility determinations unless the testimony is [** 19] incredible as a matter of law. liL. at 
126, 597 P.2d at 208; Hunter v. Dist. Court. 190 Colo. 48, 52-53, 543 P.2d 1265, 1268 
(1975); People v. Ramirez, 30 P.3d 807, 809 (Colo. 2001) (Testimony is "incredible as a 
matter of law" if it is "in conflict with nature or fully established or conceded facts. It is 
testimony as to facts which the witness physically could not have observed or events that 
could not have happened under the laws of nature."). Aside from the exceptionally rare 
instance of credibility as an issue of law, defense counsel has no legitimate motive to engage 
in credibility inquiries and may be prohibited from doing so. Smith, 198 Colo. at 126, 597 P.2d 
at 208; Hunter, 190 Colo. at 52-53, 543 P.2d at 1268. Thus, the right to cross-examination 
may be curtailed by the judge in all but the most unusual circumstances. Id. Because 
credibility is not at issue and probable cause is a low standard, once a prima facie case for 
probable cause is established, there is little defense counsel can do to show that probable 
cause does not exist. Therefore, as a practical matter, defense counsel may decline to [**20] 
cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing, understanding that the cross-
examination would have no bearing on the issue of probable cause and that the judge may 
limit or prohibit the cross-examination. Thus we conclude that the opportunity for cross-
examination at a preliminary hearing is very limited. Further, the opportunity for cross-
examination regarding the credibility of a witness, as a matter of fact, exists only to the 
extent that an attorney persists in asking questions that have no bearing on the issues before 
the court, and such irrelevant questioning is not prohibited by the court. 
Given the limited nature of the preliminary hearing in Colorado, we held in Smith that the 
Colorado Confrontation Clause "precludes the admission of the transcript of a preliminary 
hearing at a subsequent trial when the witness whose testimony is sought has become 
unavailable." lg...!. at 126, 597 P.2d at 208 (compare California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149, 26 L. 
Ed. 2d 489, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970) (in California case, where preliminary hearing constitutes a 
mini-trial, unavailable witness's prior testimony at preliminary hearing admissible)). We relied 
in Smith on the [**21] Supreme Court's analysis in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722, 20 L. 
Ed. 2d 255, 88 S. Ct. 1318 (1968), that "there has traditionally been an exception to the 
confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous 
judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by 
that defendant." The Supreme Court first held in Barber that the state did not establish 





unavailability. Id. at 724-25. [*978] Additionally, it rejected the notion that the defendant 
had waived his right to confront the witness by not cross-examining him at the preliminary 
hearing. Id. at 725. The Court noted that even if defense counsel had cross-examined the 
witness at the preliminary hearing, the Confrontation Clause still would not be satisfied on the 
facts of that case. Id. Citing the differences between a trial and a preliminary hearing, the 
Court concluded that cross-examination at the preliminary hearing would not have provided 
the same opportunity for exploration into the case. Id. 
HN13W:, The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the 
opportunity to cross-examine and the [**22] occasion for the jury to weigh the 
demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less 
searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its 
function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to 
hold the accused for trial. 
Id. The Court's decision in Barber --that the exception to the right of confrontation arises only 
when a witness is unavailable and previously gave testimony that was subject to cross-
examination by the defendant --thus foreshadowed its decision in Crawford requiring the 
same. 
Thus, we have held that HN14':i the preliminary hearing does not satisfy Confrontation 
Clause requirements. Smith, 198 Colo. at 126, 597 P.2d at 208; see also Commonwealth v. 
SmittJ., 436 Pa. Super. 277, 647 A.2d 907, 912-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)(because issue of 
credibility important at trial, and because credibility not an issue at preliminary hearing, 
preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible because defendant did not have a "full and fair 
opportunity for cross-examination"); cf. People v. Rosa, 302 A.D.2d 231, 231-32, 754 
N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (suppression [**23] hearing did not provide full and fair 
opportunity for cross-examination; little incentive to impeach credibility); Nazworth v. State, 
352 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. App. 1977) (bond hearing, the purpose of which was limited to 
setting bond, did not afford defendant a proper opportunity for cross-examination). Other 
states are split on whether a preliminary hearing provides an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination. See generally Francis M. Dougherty, J.D., Annotation, Admissibility Or Use In 
Criminal Trial Of Testimony Given At Preliminary Proceeding By Witness Not Available At Trial, 
38 A.LR.4th 378, § 6 (2004). Nonetheless, we do not wish to change the scope of the 
preliminary hearing by overruling our decision in Smith that a preliminary hearing does not 
provide an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. As the Attorney General recognized in 
oral argument, Smith is good law; it prevents the preliminary hearing from becoming a 
mini-trial which would expend time and resources the judiciary does not possess. Changing 
the purpose of these hearings would impact all criminal cases, not just those with 
Confrontation Clause issues. Preliminary [**24] hearings are limited to a determination of 
probable cause so that they do not become mini-trials. Were we to allow extensive cross-
examination by defense counsel so as to prevent any Confrontation Clause violations at trial if 
a witness were to become unavailable, we would turn the preliminary hearing in every case 
into a much longer and more burdensome process for all parties involved. Therefore, we do 
not expand the scope of preliminary hearings in order to allow them to satisfy Confrontation 
Clause requirements. Rather, we merely reiterate our holding in Smith; although a defendant 
must have been provided with a prior adequate opportunity to cross-examine an unavailable 
witness before the State can admit that witness's previous testimony into evidence, the 
preliminary hearing does not provide an adequate opportunity to cross-examine sufficient to 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause requirements. 
D. Application 
Before proceeding with our Confrontation Clause analysis, we point out what we do not 
discuss here. First, we do not delve into whether the preliminary hearing testimony would be 
admissible under a hearsay exception. Although admissibility under a hearsay 
exception [**25] may have lent support to a finding of reliability under the Roberts test, in 
light of Crawford, such a determination is [*979] no longer relevant. Even were we to find 
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the preliminary hearing testimony to meet the requirements of the residual hearsay 
exception, Fry's right to confrontation was violated nonetheless as a result of the lack of an 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination pursuant to Crawford and Smith. Stevens, 29 
P.3d at 311 ( 11Although an out-of-court statement may be admissible because it falls within an 
exception to the hearsay rule, the statement nevertheless must be excluded at a criminal trial 
if admitting it into evidence would deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him."). Thus, as we would find a Confrontation Clause 
violation in either case, we need not address whether the preliminary hearing testimony 
meets the requirements of the residual hearsay exception. Second, we do not address the 
unavailability prong of the Crawford test. It is uncontested that Burgess passed away prior to 
trial and was therefore unavailable. 
This case exemplifies the dangers of admitting preliminary [**26] hearing testimony as 
evidence at trial when the witness is unavailable. Burgess made several statements 
incriminating Fry at the preliminary hearing. Although Burgess 1s credibility was factually 
subject to attack, credibility determinations are not allowed at preliminary hearings. See 
Hunter, 190 Colo. at 52-53, 543 P.2d at 1268. Thus, Burgess's testimony could not be 
subjected to the procedural rigors required by the Confrontation Clause at the preliminary 
hearing. Moreover, the trial court further allowed the testimony to skirt the procedural 
safeguards of the Confrontation Clause by allowing the testimony to be read aloud at trial, by 
a police officer, without the opportunity for immediate rebuttal. The testimony was therefore 
never subject to direct attack. The process employed in this case illustrates how dispensing 
with an adequate opportunity for cross-examination impedes a defendant from having a 
proper chance to rebut the evidence against him. 
To start, Burgess made several statements incriminating Fry at the preliminary hearing. 
Defense counsel did not cross-examine Burgess. Nonetheless, there were several reasons to 
question Burgess's credibility. First, [**27] Burgess had motive to lie. He stated that he had 
been assaulted by Fry in the past. Additionally, defense counsel presented evidence that 
showed that Burgess was involved intimately with the victim, who was Fry1s girlfriend at the 
time. Moreover, Burgess's character was not flawless. He had a history of criminal convictions 
and evidence indicated that he was constantly intoxicated. Finally, Burgess was hard of 
hearing and it was necessary to shout when speaking to him on the telephone. Thus, his 
testimony regarding telephone conversations with Fry was not necessarily accurate. In short, 
the preliminary hearing did not provide an adequate opportunity for Fry to confront Burgess 
and reveal these issues of credibility. 
The introduction of Burgess's testimony at trial further demonstrated the importance of the 
right to confrontation. At trial, a police officer read Burgess's testimony to the jury. Although 
the trial court allowed Fry to present evidence that indirectly questioned Burgess's testimony, 
it denied Fry's request that he be allowed t.o rebut the testimony immediately after it was 
read. Thus, the procedure followed by the trial court did not allow any opportunity for Fry 
to [**28] attempt to rebut the testimony against him. 
Because Burgess's testimony was not subject to cross-examination, or tested through any 
other means, it was allowed to stand unrebutted, its truth completely unquestioned. The 
evidence which brought to light some of the credibility issues was not allowed until Fry's 
case-in-chief, much later in the trial. Thus, the effect of that rebuttal was greatly diminished. 
Even if the trial court had allowed the evidence immediately after Burgess's testimony, 
however, such indirect contradictions do not carry the force of cross-examination. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has stated, HN1~ cross-examination is the 11 'greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth."' Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 Wigmore § 1367). 
This case illustrates the truth of that statement. Indirect rebuttal evidence cannot have the 
same effect on a jury as answers to questions put directly to the witness on cross-
examination. Here the witness might [*980] have been confronted with whether he was in 
fact intimately involved with Fry's girlfriend; whether he had a drinking problem; whether he 
had been drinking before his testimony at the preliminary hearing; [**29] whether he had a 
hearing problem; and whether he had a particularly hard time hearing on the telephone. A 
skilled cross-examiner can confront a dishonest witness, or a witness who is mistaken, with 
questions that cause the witness to see the corner he has painted himself into and react in a 
way that permits the jury to judge credibility from what it hears and sees. Thus, a witness's 
testimony on cross-examination may be much more damning to the witness's credibility than 
any sort of indirect evidence the defense can offer. In sum, the opportunity for cross-
examination is without equal as a tool in the search for truth. Therefore, by admitting the 
preliminary hearing testimony of Burgess at trial, the trial court denied Fry his right to an 
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adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. As such, Fry's right to 
confront the witnesses against him was also denied. 
IV. Harmless Error Analysis 
Having established that the admission of Burgess's testimony at trial constituted 
constitutional error, we must now determine whether the error was harmless. 
HN16~ Two types of constitutional error exist: structural errors, which affect the "framework 
within which the trial [**30] proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself"; 
and trial errors, which occur "during the presentation of the case to the jury and ... may 
therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented." Blecha v. 
People, 962 P.2d 931, 942 (Colo. 1998) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 
307-08, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)). Structural errors require automatic 
reversal. Id. Trial errors require reversal unless an appellate court determines that the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The prosecution bears the burden of proving 
that the error was harmless. Id. Confrontation Clause violations are trial errors. ML. Thus, in 
this case, the prosecution must prove that the trial court's error in admitting Burgess's 
testimony absent an adequate opportunity for Fry to cross-examine Burgess was harmless. 
We find that the prosecution did not make that showing. 
HN1~ The inquiry in a harmless error analysis is "whether the guilty verdict actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error," and "not whether, in a trial that 
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict [**31] would surely have been rendered." Id. 
(quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 124 L Ed. 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078 
(1993)). Factors a reviewing court should consider include, "the importance of the witness' 
testimony to the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or 
absence of corroborating or contradictory evidence on the material points of the witness' 
testimony, the extent of the cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength 
of the prosecution's case." Id. (quoting Merritt v. People, 842 P.2d 162, 169 (Colo. 1992)). 
Thus, a reviewing court must look at the trial as a whole and decide whether there is a 
reasonable probability that the defendant could have been prejudiced by the error. ML. If so, 
the error is not harmless and the reviewing court must reverse the conviction below. Id. 
The error in this case was not harmless. Using the factors articulated above, we find that the 
prosecution did not meet its burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
First, the importance of Burgess's testimony is made clear by looking at the prosecution's 
treatment of the evidence. [**32] In its notice of intent to offer Burgess's preliminary 
hearing testimony, the prosecution stated that Burgess's testimony was "more probative on 
the issue of what happened to Darla Fischer than any other evidence in existence." In 
addition, the prosecution relied on Burgess's testimony on three different occasions in closing 
argument. 
Second, although the evidence was cumulative in that Burgess's testimony was corroborated 
by Fischer's hearsay statements and the testimony of Fry's ex-girlfriend, both witnesses were 
also subject to attack. 
[ *981] A police officer questioned Fischer about the incident after she underwent surgery to 
remove a blood clot on her brain. Because Fischer was unable to speak, the officer asked her 
to respond to questions by nodding her head yes or no. Through this officer's testimony, the 
prosecution introduced Fischer's hearsay communications that Fry had beaten her. The officer 
testified that when he asked whether Fry had caused the injuries, Fischer nodded yes. On 
cross-examination, however, defense counsel showed that the officer did not establish 
whether Fischer was referring to injuries sustained a few days earlier or to the injury that 
caused the cerebral [**33] hemorrhage. Further, the officer testified that he was not certain 
whether Fischer was oriented as to time or place. Also, the officer stated that he received only 
affirmative nods in answer to his questions with the exception of one shrug. Thus, he agreed 
with defense counsel that he could not tell if Fischer's ability to answer questions was limited 
to affirmative nods. 
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Fry's ex-girlfriend, Karen LeDoux, also testified against Fry. She stated that Fry had told her 
that he had beat up Fischer. She also testified that Fry had hurt her on previous occasions. 
However, on cross-examination, LeDoux admitted that she had previously told the hospital 
and an acquaintance that her injuries were caused by her boyfriend at the time, not Fry. In 
addition, LeDoux testified that she had been convicted of forgery. Thus, although testimony 
corroborated Burgess's testimony, it was questioned extensively on cross-examination. 
Burgess's testimony was contradicted by Fry's version of events. Fry told investigating officers 
that when Fischer came home on the morning of the injury, she appeared drunk or inebriated 
in some manner. Fry told the officer that he heard her fall outside the house and that [**34] 
when he helped her to the bedroom, she fell twice. Experts testified that Fischer's injuries 
could have been caused by a fall or accident. Additionally, the statements incriminating Fry 
were not corroborated by physical evidence. Consequently, had the trial court not erred in 
admitting Burgess's testimony, the incriminating evidence against Fry would have been 
substantially weaker. 
Third, we review the extent of cross-examination. Defense counsel did not cross-examine 
Burgess at the preliminary hearing. Although the prosecution knew that Burgess was in failing 
health, it did not depose him before trial, a procedure which would have allowed defense 
counsel an opportunity for cross-examination. See Crim. P. 15; Morse v. People, 180 Colo. 49, 
53-54, 501 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1972). Additionally, although the trial court relaxed the rules for 
admission of evidence which questioned Burgess's testimony, it did not allow the 
impeachment evidence to be presented directly after Burgess's testimony was read to the 
jury. Thus, the importance of the contradictory evidence may not have been fully realized. 
Finally, the overall strength of the prosecution's case was questionable. [**35] Burgess's 
testimony was read by a police officer and relied upon heavily by the prosecution. Although 
the prosecution had corroborating witnesses, their testimony was not immune from attack. 
Additionally, there was no physical evidence linking Fry to the crime. In sum, the prosecution 
has not shown that the error in admitting Burgess's preliminary hearing testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
V. Conclusion 
We find that the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when 
the trial court admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness at trial. 
Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, we hold that previous 
testimony is not admissible at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had an 
adequate prior opportunity for cross-examination. Thus, we reiterate our holding in Smith 
that a preliminary hearing does not present an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting preliminary hearing testimony of an 
unavailable witness at trial. Furthermore, we hold that the error was not harmless. 
[*982] Accordingly, we affirm [**36] the decision of the court of appeals remanding the 
case for a new trial. 
Dissent by: JUSTICE COATS v dissenting 
Dissent 
JUSTICE COATS v dissenting. 
In the United States Supreme Court's recent and dramatic re-interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 
1354 (2004), the majority finds support for our own, quarter-century-old, blanket prohibition 




against using the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness whose death makes him 
unavailable to testify at trial. Because I understand the analysis of Crawford to dictate 
precisely the opposite result, I respectfully dissent. 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court overturns a line of authority, stretching back at least as far 
as 1980, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980), which 
had evaluated the constitutional admissibility of prior testimony according to its 
trustworthiness, whether or not the defendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine. By 
contrast, Crawford makes clear that 11where testimonial evidence is at issue, 11 the Sixth 
Amendment demands the satisfaction of two, and only two, conditions: "unavailability and a 
prior opportunity (**37] for cross-examination." Id. at 1367-69. The Confrontation Clause 
therefore can no longer be construed to permit the admission of prior testimony taken in the 
absence of an opportunity for cross-examination, regardless of other guarantees of 
trustworthiness; or, for that matter, to sometimes require the exclusion of prior testimony as 
to which the defendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine, based on further scrutiny 
of its trustworthiness. 
Perhaps because Crawford was concerned only with an ex parte statement, made during 
police interrogation, it made no attempt to further define the term "cross-examine" or specify 
circumstances under which the 11 opportunity to cross-examine 11 might be considered 
constitutionally inadequate. It also nowhere suggests, however, that the Confrontation Clause 
envisions a more restrictive notion of 11cross-examination 11 than the term itself implies or that 
the right to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing must be considered inadequate. Quite the 
contrary, using the term "ex parte" at least a dozen times, the Supreme Court leaves no 
doubt that 11the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law 
mode [**38] of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations, as 
evidence against the accused. 11 J_g~ at 1363. 
The Crawford Court overruled Roberts, not only for analyzing the restrictions of the 
Confrontation Clause too narrowly, which resulted in the admission of "statements that do 
consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability; 11 but also for analyzing them 
too broadly by applying the same reliability standard to hearsay not consisting of ex parte 
testimony, which resulted 11 in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from 
the core concerns of the Clause." See id. at 1369. If the language it used were not clear 
enough on its face, the Supreme Court's intent in referring to an 11opportunity to cross-
examine" is apparent from its juxtaposition with the term "ex parte testimony" throughout, as 
well as the Court's expressed concern to articulate a clear standard that avoids the ad hoc 
analyses of the past. The Crawford analysis also makes abundantly clear that the Ohio 
Supreme Court in State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St.2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978), erred in 
excluding prior preliminary [**39] hearing testimony as a violation of the Confrontation 
Clause, not for the reasons given by the Supreme Court at the time, but rather by discounting 
statements in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970), 
11 suggesting that the mere opportunity to cross-examine rendered the prior testimony 
admissible." See Ohio v. Roberts, 100 5. Ct. at 2541. 
By articulating a blanket prohibition against the use of preliminary hearing statements at trial, 
the holding of this court in People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 120, 597 P.2d 204 (1979), set this 
jurisdiction apart from virtually every other jurisdiction in the country. [*9831 See, e.g., 
Rodriquez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 414 (Wyo. 1985) (expressly rejecting blanket prohibition of 
Smith); see also King v. State, 780 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 1989)(same); see generally Francis M. 
Dougherty, J.D., Annotation, Admissibility or Use in Criminal Trial of Testimony Given at 
Preliminary Proceeding by Witness not Available at Trial, 38 A.LR.4th 378, §§ 1-6 (2004) ("At 
the present time, virtually all jurisdictions appear to allow the introduction of [**40] 
testimony given at a preliminary proceeding, at which the accused was present and had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, when the witness is unavailable at trial.1'); 4 
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 491(d), 782 (2nd ed. 1994 
& Supp. 2003) (observing that by far the greater number of courts hold that receipt of 
preliminary hearing testimony against the accused does not violate his constitutional rights). 
This has been particularly true of the federal courts, which have found preliminary hearing 
testimony constitutionally admissible at trial pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, which is virtually identical with CRE 804(b)(l). See, e.g., Ex rel Haywood v. 
~Q!ff, 658 F.2d 455, 463 (7th Cir. 1981); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1980). 
Crawford has only strengthened rather than undermined those holdings. See United States v. 
Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The qualities that made [the witness'] testimony 
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admissible under 804(b)(1): unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-examination 11 
satisfy [**41] "Crawford's confrontation clause test."). 
In Smith, this court distinguished Colorado on the basis of the limited nature of its preliminary 
hearing. Limitations restricting the inquiry to probable cause and excluding questions of 
witness credibility, however, do not make preliminary hearings in this jurisdiction significantly 
different from those permitted by many other states or the federal government. See, e.g., 
Coleman v. Burnett, 155 U.S. App. D.C. 302, 477 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (preliminary 
hearing not a mini-trial on guilt but an investigation into reasonableness of bases for charge; 
examination of witnesses not of same breadth as at trial); Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 
540, 549, 6 V.I. 395 (3d Cir. 1967) ("Credibility is not the issue at a preliminary hearing as it 
is in a trial. All the arts of cross-examination which are exerted to impair the credibility of a 
witness are useless in a preliminary hearing. Nevertheless, we must accept for present 
purpose the rule which makes no distinction between testimony given at a prior trial and the 
testimony given at a preliminary hearing. 11 ). 
Whether or not the defendant committed the crime of [**42] which he is charged is the 
precise inquiry at a preliminary hearing, and the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, like 
their federal counterparts, expressly guarantee a defendant the right to be represented by 
counsel and to call and cross-examine witnesses. See Crim. P. S(a)(4)(11) & (7)(h)(2). A 
preliminary hearing in Colorado is therefore not an ex parte proceeding and, as a matter of 
law, guarantees the defendant an "opportunity to cross-examine." Although an assessment of 
the credibility of witnesses is not within the scope of a probable cause determination, a 
defendant is not barred from challenging the perceptions, memory, or even veracity of 
witnesses who testify at a preliminary hearing. Nor is it irrelevant or meaningless to confront 
a witness with the goal of inducing him to correct, modify, or even retract his earlier 
statement. Even if the exercise of a court's discretion to limit examination could, under some 
circumstances, render the opportunity for cross-examination constitutionally inadequate, the 
blanket prohibition of Smith is unjustified. 
In Smith, a case in which the primary holding concerning the materiality of perjured 
statements was subsequently [**43] overruled by the Supreme Court, see United States v. 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 132 L. Ed. 2d 444, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995), this court relied upon the 
state constitution to find a per se confrontation clause violation. Smith, 198 Colo. at 126, 597 
P.2d at 208. Nothing in the opinion indicates that the issue was presented as a challenge 
under the state constitution, separate and apart from the corresponding provision of the 
federal constitution, nor did this court attempt to articulate any distinction between the two. 
In support of its ultimate holding, the court relied only upon State v. Roberts, which construed 
the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution [*984] and was itself reversed shortly 
thereafter by the Supreme Court. Because Smith neither suggests nor contains any 
justification for a separate reading of the Colorado Constitution, and because any federal 
underpinnings, upon which it may once have rested, have now clearly been removed by 
Crawford, I would overrule it and reverse the court of appeals. 
I therefore respectfully dissent. 
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE KOURLIS v joins in the dissent. [**44] 
Footnotes 
1_1~_1 
Specifically, we granted certiorari on the following questions: 
Whether the pre-Rules of Evidence case of People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 
120, 597 P.2cl 204 (1979), should be read to categorically prohibit the 
admission of all preliminary hearing evidence even where: (a) the 
evidence is admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule set forth 
in the Rules of Evidence; and (b) the evidence is supported by 
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" sufficient to meet 





confrontation clause concerns as set forth by this court's and the United 
States Supreme Court's case law guiding the admission of evidence 
under exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
Whether in light of the other evidence of the [respondent's] guilt, any 
erroneous admission of the respondent's uncle's preliminary hearing 
testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
l .. ~ .. !.l -
HN3'f The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
11In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him .... 11 
HN4T-The Colorado Constitution states: 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses 
against him face to face .... " 
HN5'1!i Although the federal Confrontation Clause does not include specific language 
requiring face to face confrontation, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "'simply 
as a matter of English' it confers at least 'a right to meet face to face all those who 
appear and give evidence at trial."' Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 101 L. Ed. 2d 
857, 108 5. Ct. 2798 (1988) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175, 26 L. Ed. 
2d 489, 90 5. Ct. 1930 (1970). 
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You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish 
self-defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah require the 
defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show self .. defense. If the defendant 
has done this, and if such evidence of self-defense, when considered in connection with all other 
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt or if it raises a reason 
to believe that the defendant acted in self-defense, then you must find him not guilty. 
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an acquittal if there is 
any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 199 P. 145 (1921) 
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) 
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985) 
Tab K 
--.., 
INSTRUCTION NO. ·z_.y 
You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish 
self-defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah require the 
defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense. If the defendant 
has done this, and if such evidence of self-defense, when considered in connection with all other 
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, then you must find 
him not guilty. 
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an acquittal if there is 
any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
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